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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that the perceived justness of a call to jihad will resonate with 
the most dedicated and sincere audience and is a key component of the weaponization of 
the ideology.  The response to this call generates ardent support in the form of individuals 
willing to kill or be killed in order to see the jihad succeed.  In classical jihads, rulers 
were able to mobilize their nations for war when these conditions were met.  Over time, 
the ideology of jihad has transformed in parallel with changes in the world system.  Jihad 
rhetoric continues to be incorporated in the ideologies of non-state actors, who have 
arguably created ideological variants based on their own interpretations.  This thesis 
seeks to explain how the Internet makes the jihad a potent global reality by negating the 
need for infidel alliances, personalizing the actions of its adherents and distributing the 
message and methods of jihad to an indeterminate number of actors. 
This thesis recommends that continual pressure in the form of infiltration or 
cooptation of these sites forces those who promote violent jihad ideologies to increase 
their cyber security measures — essentially raising the cost in terms of time if not money.  
While these groups have evidenced a tremendous capacity for organizational learning and 
have significant resources, these resources are not endless.  Part of a successful counter 
ideological strategy needs to involve consistently applying pressure through the medium 
of the Internet in order to raise the stakes of the game and alter the radicalization process. 
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Even a cursory look at today’s headlines provides a reminder of the religious 
themes that are inextricably associated with turmoil in the Middle East.  The subject of 
numerous books and essays, the word jihad has taken on its own identity in the modern 
world.  Not only does the word jihad appear in academic and popular literature, but it has 
also made its way into the Army and Marine Corps’s Joint Publication on 
Counterinsurgency1 and even the National Security Strategy of the United States.2  
Historically, the Islamic political leaders used language of jihad to mobilize forces to 
counter heresy, defend Islamic lands from other nations and to expand the sphere of 
Islam.3  Today, the vitriolic rhetoric of a universal global jihad is manifested in 
cyberspace. The Internet provides an ideological foundation that challenges individuals to 
take the initiative and prove their faithfulness at times and places of their choosing. 
This thesis argues that the perceived justness of a call to jihad will resonate with 
the most dedicated and sincere audience and is a key component of the weaponization of 
the ideology.  The response to this call generates ardent support in the form of individuals 
willing to kill or be killed in order to see the jihad succeed.  In classical jihads, rulers 
were able to mobilize their nations for war when these conditions were met.   
This thesis will look at cases where jihad was triggered in response to a known 
threat that required an Islamic state to preemptively strike on behalf of the Islamic 
community.  It will also look at other cases where offensive actions were politically 
motivated and not given the blessing of religious authority and were, in effect, secular 
wars that did not warrant the religiously loaded title of jihad.  Jihad ideology transformed  
 
 
                                                 
1 George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf, accessed January 25, 2007, 26. 
2 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf, accessed January 25, 2007, 14. 
3 Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999, 69. 
 2
concurrently with changes in the world system.  Jihad rhetoric continues to be 
incorporated in the ideologies of non-state actors who have arguably created ideological 
variants based on their own interpretations. 
This thesis will compare the jihad ideology used to mobilize forces for the jihad 
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan with those of the global jihad taking place today.  
In both instances, a call went out to the worldwide Muslim community, or ummah; in 
response, a broad swathe of recruits from that worldwide community answered the call.  
Another reason for comparing these cases is that while the language of jihad is not used 
solely by Sunni-based groups, the majority of Islamic organizations who waged jihad 
against the Soviet Union4 and those who claim to be waging today’s global jihad are 
closely linked with Sunni groups.  Indeed, many of the actors involved are still the same.5  
Reviewing cases that have a similar universal call and a similar religious base will yield 
important insights on how the jihad has transformed in the age of globalization. 
The use of jihad rhetoric to attempt to rally a nation to arms was exemplified by 
Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom and by the Afghan 
mujahadeen during the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.6  These examples 
indicate that, at some level, politics and war are still viewed by some as the arena for the 
clash of religious ideologies as much as they are of political ideologies, access to 
resources and the like.  The historical record also shows that the jihad is not only a 
rallying cry used by caliphs, sultans and presidents to rally their people against their 
enemies.  While political leaders have invoked religious rhetoric to galvanize their 
nations for war, it is non-state actors, such as the Kharijites of early Islam and groups 
such as Al Qaeda today, who have the most notorious reputation for their fanatical 
merging of jihad ideology and warfare. 
In the past, Islamic empires or states waged wars under the banner of jihad.  In 
several instances these classical jihads were fought alongside or with the support of non-
                                                 
4 Kepel, 137. 
5 Devji, 51. 
6 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Cambridge, MA:  The Belknap Press, 2002, 136-
150. 
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Islamic “infidel” allies against mutual foes.7  While there is precedence for the legitimacy 
of these alliances within Islamic tradition, the notion of fighting alongside infidels is 
anathema to those with a fundamentalist viewpoint.8  Those who claim to fight for the 
cause of jihad and tout religious purity believe they need to remain detached or appear to 
remain detached from the influence of infidels to maintain the legitimacy of their cause.  
Yet even extremist groups have found truth in the Napoleonic maxim that an army 
marches on its belly and have at times been driven to seek support from those who do not 
share their ideology in order to acquire the tools necessary for making war.  How are 
these organizations able to reconcile their fundamentalist principles with the necessity for 
drawing support from a non-Islamic ally?  And finally, has jihad ideology been made 
inherently more effective in the age of globalization? 
In the religion of Islam, when a new believer first grasps the Qur’an, he does not 
instantaneously become a jihadi warrior brandishing an assault rifle or a suicide vest.9   
Similarly, uranium in its natural state does not simply explode when it mixes with 
oxygen, is set on fire or if it is dropped from a great height.  Likewise, the anthrax virus 
in its natural state does not arbitrarily threaten human life, but must be manufactured into 
an aerosol or powder form that can be dispersed over an area in order for its killing power 
to be unleashed as a weapon of mass destruction.  This process, popularly referred to as 
weaponization, must first take place in order to harness uranium’s explosive properties or 
anthrax’s poisonous lethality for use as a killing machine.  While jihad ideology may 
have a latent potency and a narrative of violence, actual physical violence is not initiated 
by a simple reading of the Qur’an or listening to the ravings of a fanatical cleric.  The  
 
 
                                                 
7 Firestone, 67. 
8 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, 62. 
9 The impact of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Marx’s Communist Manifesto, or Mao’s Little Red Book were 
obviously deeply tied to other cultural and political phenomenon taking place at the time of their writing.  
While these books were influential, they were perhaps neither necessary nor sufficient for turning an 
individual into a National Socialist, Communist or Maoist.  The author, who has spent a great deal of time 
reading various elements of jihad ideology, submits himself as a case study to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of the literature, by itself, to radicalize an individual. 
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process of weaponization, or mobilization, for the jihad has taken place at different 
periods of time and under various circumstances is crucial to understanding violence 
carried out under the banner of jihad. 
The literature on the Islamic views of warfare divides into two main viewpoints.  
From one point of view, Islam is seen as a religion whose very nature is rooted in 
warfare, furthered by warfare and maintained by warfare.  These authors argue that Islam 
is by nature a religion of the offense which requires its followers to spread the faith with 
the sword.  The secondary viewpoint, which makes up the larger group of writers, 
describes Islam as a religion whose main goal is establishing order in society and 
defending Muslims from oppression.   
Some authors describe warfare in the name of jihad as an embedded requirement 
on the Muslim community for Islam to achieve the goal of subjugating all men to the will 
of Allah according to the Islamic scriptures. The idea that the world is divided into two 
separate spheres, “the House of Islam (dar al-Islam) where Muslims rule…and the House 
of War (dar al-Harb)”10 is emphasized as proof that Islamic writings accentuate an 
irreconcilable polarity in the world between those who practice Islam and those who do 
not.  Essentially, “the dar al-Islam was always and will always, in theory, be at war with 
the dar al-Harb.”11  According to this viewpoint then, until Islam prevails universally, 
Muslims will be in a continual state of war until all are brought under the rule of the 
House of Islam.  That Muslims have a natural affinity for warfare is not only attributed to 
Islamic writings, but also stems from the “warlike character of the Arabian tribes,”12 
which describes the chaotic nature of the culture prior to the arrival of Islam.  The 
complicated relationship between Islam and warfare can be seen in the life of the prophet 
Muhammad who, “(i)n spite, however, of his advocacy of violence…appears to have 
been by nature of a kind and even an affectionate temperament.”13  From this 
                                                 
10 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, 73. 
11 Khadduri, 51. 
12 John Bagot Glubb, The Empire of the Arabs, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:  Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1963, 22. 
13 Glubb, 22. 
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perspective, to understand the “Roots of Muslim Rage,”14 one generally needs to look no 
further than the foundations of the religion itself. 
The larger group of writers on this subject seeks to demonstrate the multifaceted 
nature of Islam as a religion which provides guidance on how Muslims should conduct 
themselves during both war and peace.  While jihad may include “struggle for the 
defense of Islam…jihad is not supposed to include aggressive warfare.”15  The desired 
end state sought after in Islam is harmony with others and in “the conscience of the great 
majority of contemporary Muslims…implacable warfare in the name of jihad is not the 
sole or the best measure of Islamic loyalty.”16  Wars had existed for several centuries 
before Islam and early Islamic thinkers viewed wars as “forms of social sickness…which 
violated the divine laws and should be condemned.”17  Many of these early Islamic 
thinkers viewed Islam as the vehicle by which the sickness of war would be healed. 
The idea that Islam is a religion of aggression is challenged by Farooq Hassan 
who states that:  “in reality an offensive picture of Jihad had been painted by Islam’s 
enemies.”18  Hilmi Zawati likewise claims that “Peace is the rule and war is the exception 
in the doctrine of jihad” and that “Jihad is the bellum justum (Just War) of Islam.”19  As 
the world system transformed, “jihad underwent certain changes” and as Majid Khadduri 




                                                 
14 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Policy, volume 17, issue 4, 2001. 
15 John L. Esposito, Islam the Straight Path, revised third edition, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, 93. 
16 Bruce Lawrence, editor, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden.  London: 
Verso, 2005, xxi. 
17 Noor Mohammad, 384. 
18 Farooq Hassan, The Concept of State and Law in Islam (Washington: University Press of America, 
1981), 208. 
19 Hilmi Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War?  War, Peace and Human Rights under Islamic and Public 
International Law, Lewiston:  The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002, 111-112. 
20 Khadduri, 51 
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notwithstanding, the language and ideology of jihad perseveres and, instead of a “trail of 
decline,”21 there appears to be a broader, more distributed and perhaps more idealistic 
strain of jihad ideology. 
These authors recognize that, at times, the actions of groups and nations claiming 
to act on behalf of the jihad have been preemptively aggressive and unnecessarily violent.  
Deviations from the intended purpose of jihad should be critically analyzed to 
demonstrate how the language of jihad can be misunderstood or purposefully taken out of 
context and manipulated for the purpose of activating violence.  From this set of authors 
several theories have been developed to attempt to explain about how and why jihad 
ideology has frequently been co-opted and paired with national, cultural or universal 
causes to generate individual or collective violence. 
Although Khadduri indicated that the utilization of jihad rhetoric in mobilizing 
nations for war was becoming obsolete for states in the modern world system, the 
language of jihad still appears in the present world.  This thesis will look at case studies 
to evaluate how the ideology of jihad has been adapted and refined over time with 
particular attention to its salience in the age of globalization.  To evaluate the cases 
requires theoretical lenses that have been developed to analyze the connection between 
ideology and action.   
Social Mobilization Theory (SMT) looks at how individuals are drawn into 
groups who see a need to make a change in the status quo.  Three of the key causal 
variables analyzed under SMT are:  “changes in political opportunity structures,” 
“mobilizing structures”, and “cultural framing.”22  SMT analyzes the hierarchy of these 
groups and the causes which they rally for and against and looks at the rational, strategic 
and calculated responses being made by these groups in order to meet the goals of their 
organizations.  These theories also analyze the trajectories of how groups, their ideologies 
and their techniques adapt over time in response to various conditions. 
                                                 
21 Kepel, 376. 
22 Glenn E. Robinson, “HAMAS as a Social Movement,” Islamic Activism, A Social Movement 
Theory Approach, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, 116. 
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According to Christian Smith, the importance of religion in political action 
needed to be brought back in to the debate on collective action; academics had discounted 
its importance for decades, essentially excommunicating it from the social sciences.  
Whereas the social sciences had denigrated the importance of religion as the irrational 
musings of the masses or the tool of elites used to keep the masses in line, SMT 
recognized that religion can be a rational, calculating force used to “turn the world 
upside-down.”23  Religions serve two important functions for mobilization: to define 
what is “right, just, fair,” and to show how a given situation is “needlessly unjust.”24  The 
variance between reality and the ideal is where a group sees the need to mobilize in an 
attempt to correct the current situation. 
SMT attempts to explain how and why groups choose to partner with religious 
movements in order to effect change in the status quo, oftentimes becoming “the very 
substance of these social movements’ grievances, identities, organizations and 
strategies.”25  SMT does not overemphasize the influence of religion as a monocausal 
factor in explaining social movements but rather shows that it can be part of a “cultural 
toolbox” which may be used by social mobilization organizations for framing issues to 
arouse consciousness and ultimately goad people into action. 
Religious organizations offer tangible and intangible resources that have been, to 
varying degrees, a part of numerous historic social movements.  Religion can be a natural 
ideological ally of social movements by helping to bring legitimacy a cause, thereby 
adding an intangible spiritual dimension such as a moral imperative to a movement.  
Such an imperative obligates members of that religion to participate in the movement, if 
they are to prove their faithfulness and sincerity.  Religious organizations such as 
churches and mosques also provide practical resources. These include established 
networks of followers, meeting locations, religious symbolism and institutional 
                                                 
23 Christian Smith, “Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In,” Disruptive 
Religion:  The Force of Faith in Social-Movement Activism, edited by Christian Smith, New York:  
Routledge, 1996, 1. 
24 Ibid., 10. 
25 Ibid., 9. 
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protection, which a social movement can incorporate into a movement strategy.26  While 
religion has at times been marginalized by societies, it can also be a rallying point in 
times of duress.  Learning to interpret the conditions in which social mobilizations merge 
with religion, or religious groups mobilize to accomplish a political purpose, is crucial.27 
This thesis seeks to explain how the Internet makes the jihad a potent global 
reality by negating the need for infidel alliances, personalizing the actions of its 
adherents, and distributing the message and methods of jihad to an indeterminate number 
of actors.  The cases will show that the global jihad has taken lessons — on how to use 
jihad ideology to mobilize forces — from a universal audience for the war against the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan to a universal audience that targets America and “the West.”  
It has juxtaposed this ideology with the tools of globalization, enabling the jihad to 
maintain its ideological purity as it has become more operationally flexible. 
                                                 
26 Smith, 9-17. 
27 Ibid., 8-9. 
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II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF JIHAD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the foundations of jihad ideologies within Islam. It begins, 
first, by describing the conditions under which caliphs or other leader of the Islamic 
community called for jihad, to spread the faith or defend the community, which are its 
traditional functions. It then compares this classical form of jihad with the advent of 
leaders calling for a global jihad of dissent from outside the trained clerisy or Islamic 
polity, such as Osama bin Laden. It provides a foundation for the argument that this latter 
form of jihad would not be possible without modern tools of communication, especially 
the Internet. 
Islamic writings provide a narrative and scriptural foundation for jihad ideologies 
that may be used to not only satiate the requirements to wage a just cause, but also to 
energize followers to fight for that cause.  Empires, countries and non-state actors whose 
religious roots are traced to Islam have found guidance pertaining to the conduct of jihad 
in the pages of the Qur’an, the record of the life of the Prophet Muhammad, called the 
hadith, the rulings of Islamic clergy, and the philosophies of Muslim scholars and jurists.  
The ideology of jihad was not developed in an enclosed religious vacuum, however, and 
was as much a product of its environment as it was of the doctrines and practices of the 
Islamic faith.   In reviewing the meaning of jihad, these sources are crucial for 
understanding the motivation and criteria for military action taken by “self-proclaimed 
Islamic regimes”28 as well as those non-state groups claiming to act under the banner of 
jihad.   
In declaring a jihad, certain criteria theoretically needs to be met to validate in the 
minds of those engaging in the jihad that they are in fact serving on the good or just side 
of a conflict.  This is because “Islam outlawed all forms of war except the jihad, that is, 
                                                 
28 Ibrahim A.Karawan,  “Monarchs, Mullas, and Marshals:  Islamic Regimes?” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, (November 1992) Volume 524, 107.   
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the war in Allah’s path.”29  .  These stipulations include criteria pertaining to the target of 
the jihad, the legitimacy of the authority of those calling for the jihad and the audience 
being rallied for the jihad.  When an Islamic nation is, “resorting to war,”30 adhering to 
these criteria or principles is therefore necessary for maintaining an aura of justness for 
the jihad within the minds of the participants.  
B. PRE-ISLAMIC INFLUENCES 
The actions of the first Muslims in the early stages of the rise of Islam were 
arguably impacted by historical and cultural legacies that carried over from their pre-
Islamic education and upbringing.  For instance, at the time of the writing of the Qur’an, 
the belief that the end of the world was coming at any moment was prevalent in the 
thinking of many of the Arabic tribes prior to the arrival of Islam.  These forebodings 
were perhaps influenced by Christian, Zoroastrian and Jewish writings on that subject.  
This apocalyptic influence may help explain why the early focus on warfare was viewed 
as a desperate struggle by the forces of good against the forces of evil as the final days of 
the world approached.31  In order to more accurately review the ideology of jihad, the 
foundation of the religion needs to be understood in light of these pre-Islamic influences.  
It is important to understand that the environment of warfare associated with the 
beginning of jihad, show that it is not simply a manifestation of Islam. 
The time period before Islam is referred to as a time of jahiliyya, or ignorance, 
specifically of Allah and his laws.  Prior to the foundation of Islam, the Arabian 
Peninsula saw tremendous chaos, an absence of law and the devaluation of human life.  
For instance, female babies were frequently buried alive and men killed others simply to 
steal their resources.  While raiding and warfare were ever present, there were some 
lessons taken from this time period that were amenable to Islam, such as the importance 
of honor, bravery and kinship in a community.32  These tribes also agreed to a “period of 
                                                 
29 Khadduri, 62. 
30 Firestone, 15. 
31 Johnson and John Kelsay, 43-46. 
32 Firestone, 30-31. 
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nonbelligerency” during sacred months, a practice that would be carried over to Islam.33  
Although these examples point to a base level of civility existing in the culture before the 
arrival of Islam, the jahiliyya is viewed as the antithesis of true Islamic rule.     
C. JIHAD IN THE QUR’AN 
In discussing any issue related to Islam, the first source that should be considered 
is the Qur’an.  The subject of jihad is addressed in several areas scattered throughout 
various suras, or chapters in the Qur’an.  The word jihad, which means “to strive or 
struggle,”34 is generally ascribed two distinct meanings within the Qur’an.  First is the 
greater jihad, which describes an individual’s internal battle against his own flesh as well 
as personal efforts made to manifest God’s will on earth, also known as jihad of the heart.  
Subordinate to this is the lesser jihad, sometimes called military jihad, in which 
individuals may be called upon to take part in physical fighting or warfare on behalf of 
the faith or for the good of the community.35  The Qur’an further elaborates on both 
aspects, describing a jihad of the tongue as efforts made to spread the faith through 
dialogue and reasoning, as opposed to the jihad of the sword, which involves more direct 
methods.   
Instructions relating to the conduct of the jihad are spread throughout the Qur’an.  
Taken as a whole, the jihad verses give a broad, sometimes conflicting picture of what 
jihad is.  To explain these variances, the process of abrogation was used to highlight 
which suras, or portions thereof, were nullified or expounded upon by later Qur’anic 
revelations.  For instance, some suras apparently place restrictions on fighting, 
admonishing the community to:  
Fight in the path of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits, 
for God does not love transgressors. (Sura 2:190)36 
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In contrast, the sura that immediately follows, if taken on its own, seems to 
encourage the community to fight in the way of jihad as a kind of continuing action:  
“Kill them wherever you find them” (Sura 2:191).  Islamic scholars generally agree that 
these two suras, while co-located in the Qur’an, were not intended to be linked in a 
historical context but rather were placed together because they were dealing with a 
similar subject.37  Debate has taken place over which limits Sura 2:190 is referring to and 
how it is abrogated by 2:191.  If the limits referred to in Sura 2:190 are geographical 
limits, are these then abrogated by Sura 2:191?  If so, then it could be deduced that the 
sura implies that there are no longer restrictions as to where and when transgressors may 
be killed.  The limits could also be referring to the killing of noncombatants with 2:191 
raising the ban to allow such action.  While Islamic scholars and others continue to 
debate the meanings, context and abrogation of texts such as these examples, other 
individuals have taken it upon themselves to develop their own interpretations and 
actions in response to their version of what the texts mean, regardless of the ongoing 
debates. 
The debates, around which suras hold their ground while others are considered to 
be abrogated, are important — not just for grammatical or theological accuracy.  These 
passages are the cornerstone for understanding how the jihad may be transformed into 
physical warfare.  While the majority of scholarly work on Islam may take these Qur’anic 
verses in their entirety with a view to understanding their context and interpretation, it is 
also apparent that the suras pertaining to jihad are ripe for manipulation by those who use 
“selective quotes from the Quran to support their positions,”38 and justify their actions in 
a religious shroud. 
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D. JIHAD IN THE SUNNA 
In addition to the Qur’an, another source of Islamic legal foundations is the 
Sunna, which “includes what the Prophet said, what he did, and those actions that he 
permitted or allowed.”39  These include several hadiths, or “remembered stories about 
what the Prophet said and did,”40 that describe Muhammad’s views on the jihad.  These 
contributions are important for they describe in great detail how Muhammad actually 
lived his life and how he handled himself in various situations, including warfare.  Some 
major issues with the hadiths arise from the numerous word-of-mouth testaments 
circulating which were attributed to Muhammad by various sources several years after his 
death and the problems inherent with verifying the validity of these sources.  As some 
aspects of these oral traditions may have been lost in translation and others may have 
even been blatant forgeries, the hadith is rightfully viewed with some skepticism.  In 
general, however, the hadiths that were accepted by the majority of Islamic scholars were 
in keeping with the society and worldview of the times.41 
The hadith records a great number of traditions that expound the virtues of 
participating in the jihad, specifically the militarized variant.  Included are the blessings 
promised for those who are killed while taking part in jihad, including direct entry into 
paradise as well as distributed intercessory blessings for the families of the fallen.  In 
another instance, Muhammad is credited with stating that he wished he could be killed 
only to be reincarnated several times over so that he could meet the same fate each time 
— death in the way of jihad.42  
Involvement in the jihad was considered so important to some that they viewed it 
as the sixth pillar of Islam43 and, according to their viewpoint, compulsory for the entire 
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Muslim community.  Part of the hadith tradition holds that the jihad is the zenith of 
dedication to Islam above all other requirements.  This viewpoint is attributable to a 
response recorded in a hadith in which Muhammad is recorded as having said that there 
was no act comparable to jihad.44 
In addition to providing the impetus for participating in jihad, the hadith also 
posits the requirement that jihad may only be waged on specific terms.  The hadith is 
quite specific that those who participate in jihad must be fighting “in the path of God” 
and not for personal glory, wealth or otherwise.  This is because “Islam outlawed all 
forms of war except the jihad, that is, the war in Allah’s path.”45  In all, the hadith gives a 
much clearer picture than the Qur’an of the necessity, guidelines and subsequent benefits 
associated with participating in the jihad.46 
E. JIHAD IN ISLAMIC TRADITION AND LITERATURE 
Aside from the Qur’an and the hadith, other sources from the Islamic world are 
also considered part of the body of knowledge on the subject of jihad.  Within the 
volumes of Islamic literature, several authors are specifically mentioned as crucial 
influencers of the Islamic juridical tradition in the arena of warfare: Ibn Khaldun, Ibn 
Tamiyya, Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, al-Awza’i and Muhammad b. Jarir al-
Tabari.  According to Ibn Tamiyya, the criteria for engaging in warfare includes:  “to 
defend Muslims against real or anticipated attacks; to guarantee and extend freedom of 
belief; and to defend the mission (al-da’wah) of Islam.”47  Warfare was primarily for the 
purpose of “securing peace, justice and equity.”48  These writers are developing a 
doctrine of jihad that describes a change in outlook from the early days of Islam, the 
Meccan period, to the days when Islam began to expand exponentially, referred to as the 
Medinan period.   
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Concurrent with the growth of Islam was a transformation of jihad ideology as 
understood by the experts at the time: 
Qur’anic references to jihad by Muhammad that render the expansionist 
fight against unbelievers obligatory under any circumstances are said to 
take precedence over earlier (Meccan period) references to jihad against 
non-Muslims by means of preaching and persuasion.49 
This example lends some credence to the evolutionary theory of jihad.  According to this 
theory, a change in jihad ideology took place over time.50  In the first days of Islam, a 
virtual ban on fighting existed — where jihad of the tongue, or reasoned arguments, were 
the preferred method of spreading the faith.  Over time, however, the frequency of jihad 
of the sword gradually increased as the number of Muslims grew, and the power of the 
Islamic state expanded.  
As the number of followers of Islam grew, their presence became a threat to the 
non-Muslim world, which responded by persecuting those who had adopted the new 
religion.  In response, jihad ideology, it has been argued, apparently evolved to allow for 
defensive fighting on behalf of the community, as during the Meccan period described 
above.  It was during this period that Islam was first blooded through combat at the Battle 
of Badr.  Given the nature of the Qur’anic criteria, as well as the instructions in the 
hadith, jihad ideology was readily transformable to meet the practical security needs of 
the community.  It would later prove its malleability as a mobilizing tool for political 
ends, namely the expansion of the Muslim community and the geographic enlargement of 
the Islamic Empire. 
Many scholars describe the jihad as an evolutionary process moving from 
defensive fighting to offensive warfare paralleling the establishment of the Islamic 
Empire.  In his criticism of the evolutionary theory of jihad, Reuven Firestone argues that 
the jihad did not evolve so much as it transformed with different variants of jihad, from 
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countering heresy to defending Muslim lands from invasion taking place simultaneously 
throughout history.  He describes a “jump rather than a slow evolutionary change” from 
“mundane war to Holy War.”51  Firestone’s argument addresses the problem of looking 
at the development of jihad doctrine as an evolutionary process vice as an adaptable tool 
that is capable of being shaped to fit specific ideological and pragmatic needs under 
different circumstances.52  This viewpoint more clearly explains the variance and 
dispersion of jihad ideologies. 
F. JIHAD IN PRACTICE 
1. Jihad in Early Islam: Bringing Order out of Chaos 
The arrival of Islam brought a tremendous shift in the worldview of those who 
joined its ranks.  No longer were the identities of tribe the most important loyalty but 
rather loyalty to Allah and the Muslim community.  While some barriers between people 
were being torn down, different barriers were developing as the new religion met the 
resistance of those who still followed the ignorant ways of jahiliyya.  For Muslims, jihad 
was the vehicle provided to rid the world of this ignorance and establish an Islamic 
kingdom on earth.53   
The need to bring order out of the chaos of jahiliyya was part of the vision that the 
first Muslims saw.  Indeed, the success of Islam in establishing itself on the Arabian 
Peninsula is held up as proof of the validity of its message.54  This interpretation of the 
success of Islam over the chaos of the jahiliyya is an important part of the tradition of 
belief that Islam is the cure for the ills of the world with jihad as one of the methods by 
which that cure is administered.  In the early stages of the Islamic Empire, “the jihad was 
therefore employed as an instrument for both the universalization of religion and the 
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establishment of an imperial world state.”55  This theme would find further meaning 
under the sultans of the Ottoman Empire and is a theme that is interwoven throughout the 
history of Islam. 
2. The Establishment of Anti-establishment Jihad 
While jihad ideology was serving as the religious political tool for justifying the 
use of force for the Islamic Empire, another form of the ideology was taking form; it 
would provide a counter narrative at times to call into question and even overthrow 
regimes that had erred from the pure path.  This iteration of the jihad first appeared 
during the battle of Siffeen in 657.  Ali, the fourth “rightly guided caliph,” had his claim 
to the caliphate challenged by another claimant to the throne, Muawiyah.  As a result, 
Muawiyah was labeled an apostate and Ali led a punitive coalition to Syria to punish the 
dissenters and validate his authority. 
As the battle raged, Muawiyah sent representatives with Qu’rans attached to their 
spears to parley with Ali’s forces.  A truce was reached, and Muawiyah and his forces 
were allowed to return unharmed to Syria.  While this pragmatic effort saved lives, part 
of Ali’s coalition, the Kharijites, despised Ali for his compromising “submission to 
arbitration”56 and allowing the apostate, Muawiyah, and his forces to live.  In a bold 
attempt to change three regimes, the Kharijites intended to kill Muawiyah, Ali and the 
governor of Egypt all on the same day.  They only succeeded in killing Ali, leaving 
Muawiyah to seize the caliphate for himself.57 
The “pure” ideology of the Kharijites provides an historical precedent for 
understanding the jihad of dissent.  The “rigorous Puritanism and religious 
fundamentalism”58 of the Kharijites are a picture of counter-regime jihad ideology.  It is 
an ideology that places devotion to itself above the rule of men, even men who are  
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endowed with Islamic political authority.  This strain of the ideology coexisted with the 
state-centric jihad of the caliphs and would provide a foundation for the principles of the 
jihad of dissent in the future. 
3. Jihad in the Ottoman Empire 
Evaluating the justness of a war is an interesting and largely subjective task, 
especially since historians seem to either eulogize or demonize leaders and nations.  In 
using the established criteria to evaluate the decision making of Ottoman sultans, a basic 
foundation of the patterns of government of the Ottoman Empire needs to be laid out.  
The Ottoman Empire was ruled by a series of sultans in a form of government that has 
been described as being “characterized by a complete reliance on military force and 
arbitrary power of despotism.”59  Such a generalization does not adequately discuss the 
nuances of the connections between political leadership, religious influence and war. 
For the first part of its history, the Ottoman Empire was not a purely Islamic 
regime as had been the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties or the Safavid dynasty in 
neighboring Persia, which took a stricter approach to the enforcement of the shariah.  
Since the peoples it conquered were allowed to follow several varieties of faiths or no 
faith at all, as an empire, the Ottomans did not force major changes on their subjects as 
long as taxes were paid and order was maintained.  In this sense the empire, “was 
regarded by Muslims of the Arabian heartland as a heretical entity,” by embracing the 
form of Islam, but not its essence.60  Although not viewed with respect initially, the 
legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic government evolved through various 
events both internal and external to the empire. 
a. The Ottoman Army:  Infidels as the Practitioners of Jihad 
The soldiers of the army of the Ottoman Empire, the Janissaries, have an 
almost legendary status in some military history circles.  The Janissaries were technically 
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a slave army raised from the stock of non-Muslim families since it was unlawful for a 
freeborn Muslim to be bound as a slave. This system was known as devshirme and was 
designed to train soldiers and civil servants for service to the empire.  The power these 
“slaves” were given virtually negates the Western connotation of the word, but they were 
ultimately bound by a loyalty to the sultan alone.  As part of their training, the Janissaries 
were trained in Islam and were, by definition, a Muslim army and rightfully authorized 
according to Islamic tradition to engage in jihad and obligated to live by its tenets.  In 
addition to infantry, the Ottoman military consisted of a cavalry force, known as the 
sipahi, comprised horsemen who were bound to the sultan in exchange for control of 
land.  Like the Janissaries, the sipahi also were professing Muslims but they were raised 
outside of the devshirme system.  Combined with the Janissaries, they provided the 
Ottoman Empire with a force that would enable the empire to expand across North 
Africa, deep into the heart of Europe and down to the Persian Gulf.61  With an army loyal 
to him alone, the sultan would not have needed the support of his population and could 
generally initiate warfare without having to activate jihad ideology to raise a force. 
b. Establishing the Caliphate and the Legitimate Use of Force 
The legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire through the eyes of Islam is a 
necessary step in evaluating their authority to wage a jihad according to the criteria 
established by the Qur’an and Islamic tradition.  In 1516-17, Sultan Selim I led the 
Ottoman Army on a series of campaigns that would not only expand the empire, but 
would validate the legitimacy of the sultanate according to the Islamic faith.  Under 
Selim I, the Ottomans captured the two most holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina in 
the Hijaz on the west coast of Arabia.  With these actions, they became the protector of 
those sites and essentially assumed responsibility for ensuring the safety of Muslims 
involved with the hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and fifth pillar of Islam.  Selim 
was also able to capture Cairo.  After Selim captured Cairo, the reigning caliph there, 
whose lineage had been maintained since escaping the Mongols, relinquished his title to 
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Selim.  With the two holy cities under their control and the legitimate title of caliph, the 
Ottoman sultans now had the outward trappings required of a truly Islamic empire.62 
Another important step in the growth of the Ottoman Empire and its 
legitimization in the eyes of Islam was the adherence to the Seriat, or shariah, a set of 
“ideals” for governing an Islamic state.  As an ideal law, the shariah was designed to “put 
a check on the power of the sovereign”63 and since it was an idea, not a person, it would 
outlast the sultan.  During the first two hundred fifty years of the empire, the rules of the 
game were more or less established at the behest of the sultan with the conquered 
territories being governed as those leaders saw fit as long as that did not interfere with the 
operation of the empire.   
The religious credibility of specific sultans is not without controversy.  For 
instance, in one collection of essays on the Ottomans, a writer states, “Mehmed the 
Conqueror, Selim I, Murat IV, Mahmud II, and Abdulhamit II are considered despotic 
rulers.”64  Another author in the same collection states that “the sultan was not an 
autocrat, as so glibly stated in many Western texts,” and “no sultan could suspend the 
Sheriat.”65  This apparent disparity highlights the point that evaluating whether an 
Ottoman sultan was a true caliph or not is a matter of historical opinion. 
The major territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire took place 
predominantly under two sultans, Mehmed II, “the Conqueror” and Suleiman I, “the 
Magnificent.”  A partial review of their campaigns will provide case studies in 
understanding the nature of jihad during the Ottoman Empire. 
c. Mehmed II, the Conqueror 
Mehmed Celebi was thrust into the role of sultan around the age of 
thirteen when his father and predecessor, the sultan Murad II, suddenly abdicated his 
                                                 
62 William C. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East. 3d edition. Boulder: Westview Press, 
2004, 40-41. 
63 Farah, 41. 
64 Ibid., 15. 
65 Ibid., 41. 
 21
thrown following a great victory over the Hungarians at the battle of Varna.  To help 
mentor the young sultan, the grand vizier, Halil Pasha, became the power behind the 
throne.  The legitimacy of Mehmed’s title of sultan-caliph in the eyes of the religious 
community appears to have been questionable at first.  His relationship with the ulema 
had been strained when he was younger as a result of his friendship with a heretical 
Persian missionary who was eventually burned by the ulema for his heresy.  As Mehmed 
grew up, however, he realized the importance of his position as caliph and did take on the 
responsibility of protector of the faith.66 
(1) Constantinople:  Jihad in the Offense.  Not only did 
Mehmed protect the faith, but under his reign, the greatest blow to Christendom would be 
dealt in the capture of Constantinople.  The initiation of the campaign appears to have 
been for the purpose of expansion.  Although the time period was characterized by 
warfare, there does not appear to have been an immediate threat from the Byzantines.  In 
fact, the opposite would appear to be true since as Mehmed was advancing, Emperor 
Constantine sent three separate sets of envoys with gifts to mollify the sultan and uncover 
his true intentions.  Those intentions became blatantly clear when Mehmed beheaded the 
last group of emissaries that the emperor sent.  Mehmed continued his advance on 
Constantinople and put it under siege.  Constantine sent one final message to Mehmed to 
avoid a battle and maintain control of his city.  To his credit, Mehmed did give 
Constantine the opportunity to surrender the city without a fight.  In response, 
Constantine refused to surrender and Mehmed refused to withdraw from the siege. The 
assault began.   
After a tremendous battle, the Ottomans were able to breach the 
walls of this formidable city.  Upon the seizure of the city, the Ottoman troops massacred 
significant portions of the population.  The troops also took part in plundering the 
churches and homes of the inhabitants.  Mehmed further secured his victory by  
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eliminating the remainder of the ruling family to ensure that there were none “among the 
Byzantine Greeks who could be named King.”  As a final sign of the Ottoman victory, 
the name of the city was changed to Istanbul.67 
(2) Vlad the Impaler:  Jihad in the Defense.  In 1462, a unique 
campaign would be taken by Mehmed to restore unity and civility to one of the vassal 
states of the empire.  The legendary Wallachian Prince Vlad Dracul III, also known as 
“The Impaler,” and the inspiration for the character Dracula, stopped paying the tribute 
he was obligated to pay the Ottomans following an agreement with Sultan Murad II.  
Under the Ottoman system of government, vassal states were allowed to govern as they 
saw fit, and the horrifically cruel reign of Vlad the Impaler is one of the bloodiest in 
history.  His obscene treatment of his population was apparently not a cause for 
interference until he stopped paying his tribute, and Mehmed’s intelligence sources began 
to reveal that Vlad had plans to fight the Ottomans.  The Ottomans attempted to capture 
Vlad and make him pay the tribute.  Vlad was warned of their scheme, the plan backfired 
and Vlad got the upper hand.  In his typical fashion, the two Ottomans who made the 
attempt to capture Vlad had their hands and feet cut off before he had them impaled.68  
Following the attempt to capture him, Vlad turned his fury on the 
Ottomans living in Wallachian territory.  He had some 25,000 of them impaled, including 
women and children.  Vlad’s open rebellion against Mehmed was further driven home 
when he nailed the turban to the head of one of the sultan’s messengers.  The news of the 
atrocities to the Ottomans and Vlad’s rebellion provided sufficient justification to call for 
jihad for the purpose of restoring peace to his territory as well as protecting and avenging 
its inhabitants.  
Mehmed’s campaign against Vlad may be classified as a just jihad 
since both the reasons for beginning the conflict as well as the conduct of the campaign 
apparently adheres to the criteria.  These actions seem to be in contrast to the siege at 
Constantinople.  Furthermore, the fact that Mehmed allowed Vlad to rule his subjects in 
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such a cruel manner, and only intervened when he stopped paying tribute to the empire, 
further taints the justness of the sultan’s reign. 
d. Suleiman I, the Magnificent 
As his title suggests, Sultan Suleiman (1520-1566) accomplished a great 
many things and brought the Ottoman Empire to its highest point historically.  Under his 
reign, the European capitals of Belgrade and Budapest would come under Ottoman 
control and the city of Vienna would be besieged once and threatened with siege a second 
time.  A diehard warrior, Suleiman marched with his men on thirteen campaigns and 
eventually died “with his boots on” on the field of battle. 
Suleiman was obligated to the shariah and did serve as the sultan-caliph 
and defender of the Islamic faith.  As the tenth Ottoman Sultan, Islamic prophecy and 
tradition looked at Suleiman as the “‘Perfector of the Perfect Number’ hence the Angel of 
Heaven.”  The significance of the number ten as the perfect number relates to the Ten 
Commandments, the ten parts of the Qur’an, and several other instances of the number 
ten, to include the number of fingers and toes that a man is born with.69  With these 
credentials, Suleiman undoubtedly met the criteria for being a legitimate caliph according 
to Islamic principles. 
Suleiman would also be given the opportunity to make military decisions 
based on Islamic principles.  As the defender of the faith, as well as being the head of the 
Ottoman Empire, Suleiman entered a dynamic world of religious and political intrigue, 
which frequently manifested itself in war.  The European powers controlled by Charles 
V, Francis I and Henry VIII were in a steady struggle for the control of Europe, and these 
Christian armies were in regular contact with the armies of the Ottomans.  Within this 
framework, Christian powers also looked to the Ottomans to occasionally create a 
“sacrilegious union of the Lily and the Crescent,”70 as they vied for control.  The use of  
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jihad during this time period indicates that it was a malleable religious tool that could be 
used by the sultan to take the Ottomans to war whether in defense of Islam or for the 
expansion of the empire.  
4. Jihad in the Islamic Nation State:  The Rise of Saudi Arabia 
The rise of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is deeply intertwined with the ideology 
of jihad.  As wars make states, so the jihad aided tremendously in the creation of the 
Kingdom.  The process began early in the eighteenth century when a radical Muslim 
scholar named Ibn Wahhab reinvigorated jihad ideology.  He partnered with an Arabian 
chieftain named Muhammad Ibn Saud who was looking to expand his territory. “Armed 
with a new dogma,”71 and new muskets, Saud’s force took large portions of the Arabian 
Peninsula including the seizure of both Mecca and Medina from the Turks.  In taking 
Mecca, the Wahhabis demonstrated their religious ferocity by destroying the tomb of 
Muhammad, whose gravesite, for them, had become a symbol of idolatry.72 
As Muhammad Ibn Saud and the Wahhabis were enjoying their victory, however, 
their actions did not sit well with the Turkish sultan.  He tasked Mehmed Ali, the 
Egyptian Sultan, “to recover the holy cities.”73  On their third attempt, the Turks 
successfully unseated the Wahhabis in 1817.  Wahhab was captured and, as a last-minute 
insult to his extreme legalism, he “was forced to listen to the hated music of a guitar 
before he was executed.”74  This defeat left a power vacuum on the peninsula, which was 
filled by a political rival to the Sauds, the Ibn Rashid family. 
World War I would provide a political opportunity opening for the House of Saud 
to make a return to power.  Prior to the war, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal al-
Saud (known as Ibn Saud in most Western countries) had continued the religious political 
alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahhabis.  Together they waged jihad and 
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took over Riyadh and killed the governor Ibn Rashid had left in charge.  During the war, 
Ibn Saud created a partnership with the English, who were at war with the Turks.  When 
the war ended, a secularizing power replaced the Turkish sultanate and “Ataturk’s 
abolition of the caliphate in 1924,”75 removed the religious authority for waging state 
centric jihad. 
Ibn Rashid seized the moment and proclaimed himself “Caliph of all Islam.”76  
Here the ideology of dissent reappeared as Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi allies, known as the 
Ikhwan, considered Rashid’s assumption a blasphemy.  They waged jihad on the House 
of Rashid until defeating them in 1925.  Ibn Saud was declared “King of the Hijaz” in 
Mecca in January 1928.  The army of Ikhwan combined with the House of Saud and 
established a kingdom where this ideology became its source of its power.  The jihad of 
dissent had helped to create a state and the Ikhwan continued to serve as the “shock 
troops”77 for the Sauds. 
After a gestation period, however, the jihad ideology, which had established the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, would come back to challenge it.  As a political ruler 
operating within the geography of the Arabian Peninsula, King Saud needed to control 
the Ikhwan, who continued to employ their bloody methods of forcefully converting 
unbelievers throughout the Arabian Peninsula.  The Ikhwan “detested the king’s alliance 
with Britain and his extravagantly polygamous lifestyle,”78 and derided his lack of zeal in 
finishing the purification of the peninsula.  To counter the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud sought out 
the blessing of the religious community.  They granted the king “the sole power to 
declare jihad,”79 a power he used, in conjunction with British aircraft, to quell the fury of 
the Ikhwan and consolidate his rule over the kingdom. 
                                                 
75 Kepel, 43. 
76 Nafziger, 76. 
77 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower:  Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2006, 62. 
78 Ibid., 62. 
79 Ibid., 63. 
 26
The case of Saudi Arabia demonstrates both how jihad may be used to establish a 
nation state and how it can become the force that challenges the authority of the nation 
state.  The jihad of the state and the jihad of the anti-state may appear in the same 
timeframe and in the same geography.  Both forms apply religious rhetoric; however, 
while state-centric jihad becomes a tool in the hands of an earthly ruler, the jihad of 
dissent respects no earthly authority that it sees as operating outside of the will of Allah.  
5. Jihad in the Modern World:  Ideological Transformation 
The development of jihad ideology, from the days of the early Islamic Empires 
through the age of Islamic nation states and finally to its current state, has been discussed 
in numerous post-September 11 books, such as Fawaz Gerges’ Why Jihad Went Global, 
Marc Sageman’s Understanding Terrorist Networks and Lawrence Wright’s The 
Looming Tower.  A brief synopsis of this gestation period of jihad ideology shows the 
geographic leapfrogging and transformation across the political landscapes of the Middle 
East.   
The most notable contributor to this transformation was an Egyptian named 
Sayyed Qutb, whose book, Milestones, was published in 1964. Qutb developed and 
challenged the concept of a modern day jahiliyya that had come about because of an 
“absence of values”80 in the Western world and had trickled down into the Muslim world.  
This milieu was continued under the secular Egyptian regime of Gamel Abdul Nasser.  
Qutb would advocate a jihad by the faithful to restore the ummah.  His message of jihad 
against unjust Muslim rulers, further reinforced by his execution, or “martyrdom,” was 
picked up by Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose influence and partnership with Osama Bin 
Laden — and their development of the global jihad franchise — have been well studied. 
Operationally, the ideology of jihad has transformed over time, much like the 
tactics and techniques of warfare have themselves been adapted in response to political, 
technological, economic and cultural changes that haven taken place throughout history.  
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A recent book about the new global terrorism describes to how the language of jihad can 
be interwoven with the mindset of today’s violent non-state actors: 
Although interstate combat has become rare, internal conflict involving 
non-state actors — insurgents, terrorists, brigands, warlords, ethnic 
militias, and so on — has become quite common.  Such conflict can take 
several forms:  revolutionary (or fundamentalist) struggles to replace 
existing authorities with more ideologically (or religiously) “correct” 
regimes.81 
This discussion has an interesting parallel with the concept of generational 
warfare, which describes the transformation of warfare over time.  According to 
generational warfare theory, the world is currently seeing what is known as fourth 
generation warfare (4GW), which is largely asymmetrical in its conduct.  Those who 
practice this new generation of warfare, “focus on a long-term strategic approach.  They 
focus on winning wars, not battles.”82  Although this approach to warfare is not unique to 
the twenty-first century — and the history of warfare cannot easily be segmented into 
clear cut “generations,” — there have undoubtedly been transformations in the nature of 
warfare, to include its ideological component.  The global jihad has embraced the forms 
of warfare described in the 4GW concept.  The effectiveness of this movement is 
evidenced by its ability to harness the tools of globalization which have greatly improved 
the means by which jihad may be waged.  
G. CONCLUSION 
In declaring a jihad, certain criteria had to be met to validate that, in the minds of 
those engaging in the jihad,  they were in fact on the good or just side of the conflict.  
Here a comparison may be drawn between the ideology of jihad and Western Just War 
theory, which lays out principles that nations should consider in evaluating the 
justifications for engaging in a particular conflict.  Adhering to these criteria or principles 
is necessary for maintaining an aura of justness for the jihad within the minds of the 
                                                 
81 Michael T. Klare, “The New Face of Combat:  Terrorism and Irregular Warfare in the 21st 
Century”, The New Global Terrorism:  Characteristics, Causes, Controls, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 29. 
82 Thomas X. Hammes, On War in the 21st Century, St. Paul, Minnesota:  Zenith Press, 2006, 222. 
 28
participants.  Understanding this criteria, and how it has been applied by various 
participants responding to different situations, is essential for interpreting the ideology of 
jihad.  
It is an understatement to say that the study of religion, like the study of politics, 
draws a vast array of conflicting viewpoints.  In the study of jihad, these two spheres 
overlap; This is because Islam encompasses guidance pertaining to the conduct of 
politics, including warfare, in its scriptures and subsequently in its implementation.  This 
guidance has been reviewed by numerous experts who have come up with as many 
conclusions.  The controversial subject of jihad has yet to be settled, and it remains a field 
that requires further study. 
The language of jihad has existed for centuries.  While the word in Western ears 
typically evokes images of violence, as a word which means struggle, it can be applied to 
many situations, most importantly, the inner battle against one’s own temptations.  The 
military aspect of jihad has foundations in the Qur’an as well as other Islamic sources, 
such as the hadith, or sayings of Muhammad.  While the majority of scholarly work on 
Islam may take these Qur’anic verses in their entirety with a view to understanding their 
context and interpretation, it is also apparent that the Qur’anic scriptures pertaining to 
jihad are ripe for manipulation by those who use “selective quotes from the Qur’an to 
support their positions,”83 and justify their actions in some religious shroud. 
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III. JIHAD IN THE HANDS OF INFIDELS:  THE AFGHAN JIHAD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter looks at how jihad ideology was adopted following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan as the narrative of dissent for a local population as well as the 
rallying cry for the Muslim world to defend the faith.  This struggle transformed the 
international image of Islam, weakened the once powerful Soviet Union and contributed 
to bringing an end to the Cold War.  A minor player in the international scene, the 
country of Afghanistan became the site of one of many Cold War proxy battles that took 
place between the Soviet Union and the United States.  For America, it became a battle 
against communism and a chance for revenge by making the Soviet Union “pay a high 
price in blood for their support of the North Vietnamese.”84 
Not only was this a struggle between superpowers; for the Afghans, it became a 
holy war and a battle to reclaim their homeland, an “Anti-Soviet”85 or “Afghan Jihad.”86  
The mobilization for the call to jihad occurred not only amongst the local Afghan 
population, but also resonated around the Muslim world where many saw in that ideology 
an opportunity to travel abroad, defend their faith and become a vaunted mujahadeen. 
The Afghan Jihad would also give the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf an 
opportunity to enhance their religious credentials against the twin challenges of Shiism 
and the revolutionary ideals being exported from the Islamic Republic of Iran.87  The 
alliance against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan mobilized a diverse cast of  
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players with a mix of ideologies, resources and motivations.  These alliances of 
opportunity provide a valuable case study for applying the tenets of Social Mobilization 
Theory (SMT). 
The Afghan Jihad has been analyzed through different lenses. With the onset of 
September 11and the global jihad, however, the events, personalities and ideologies that 
influenced the Afghan Jihad should continue to be studied for an understanding of the 
causal factors that have contributed to the mobilizing capacity and resonance of jihad 
ideology in the past. 
B. GIVING JIHAD A CHANCE:  POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE 
SOVIET INVASION 
According to SMT, the conditions for group mobilization occur when there is a 
shift in political opportunity structures.  As Glenn Robinson points out, this may come in 
the form of “changes in international structures (e.g., globalizations, the demise of the 
USSR, attention or inattention by foreign powers).”88  Within the context of the Cold 
War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought this attention in the form of the two 
superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States.  This created the type of change in 
political opportunity structure that SMT argues provides the impetus for social 
movements to develop to challenge the status quo.  To explain this phenomenon, it is 
important to look at the nature and conduct of the Soviet Union to understand why the 
struggle was framed in religious phraseology.  Also, there needs to be an analysis of why 
that particular ideological frame was effective in the Afghan situation. 
1. Regime Change in Kabul 
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which took place on 27 December 1979, 
violently and decisively changed Afghan political opportunities.  Following a series of 
coups begun in 1973, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had 
assumed power at the time of the invasion under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin, a 
problematic partner for the Soviets.  The PDPA “relied on Soviet, not Afghan, 
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experience” so much so that they “became ever more alienated from their own people.”89  
The presence of Soviet advisors had steadily increased as part of the “swift absorption of 
Afghanistan into the Soviet bloc.”90  Scattered Afghan resistance to the PDPA and its 
Soviet handlers was already underway prior to the invasion, including an uprising in 
Herat, which, with the help of Soviet air power, was repressed after killing an estimated 
25,000 people.  This resistance had not yet “spread to the national level”91 at the time the 
Soviets decided to implement a regime change in Kabul.  
Under the guise of coming to the rescue of the PDPA to help it quell the rebellion 
and prepare it for the supposedly impending invasion by the United States,92 the invasion 
made the Soviet presence in Afghanistan blatantly more formal as they quickly toppled 
their former partner, Amin, killing his sons and all of the palace guard, some 1,800 
troops.  The Soviets replaced Amin with Babrak Karmal of the communist Khalqi 
“Masses” party.  Repression under the PDPA had been indiscriminate and cruel, but it 
was still the work of Afghans against other Afghans.  When the Soviets arrived en masse, 
the resistance movements, which by that time had “an extended period of mass 
organizing and mobilization”93 against the PDPA regime, were now ripened for large-
scale revolution.  Support for the revolution steadily increased among the Afghan 
population —now it was a foreign occupier, like the British and Russians who had 
manipulated Afghan politics in the past, who was doing so again.  What had been an 
internal struggle against the PDPA regime “turned into a war of liberation only with the 
arrival of the Soviet troops.”94 
The Soviet invasion did not happen in a vacuum, and was not the only factor 
leading to the resistance, which generally took the form of an anti-Soviet jihad.  
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Dissension among the tribes toward the regime in Kabul had existed for some time in 
response to reforms they had attempted to enact.  What the Soviet invasion brought was a 
drastic shift in the character of the regime through the direct intervention of a foreign 
invader in a predominantly Muslim country.  Furthermore, the presence of Soviet troops 
in their towns was making it painfully apparent to “ordinary Afghans that atheists had 
occupied their homeland.”95 
This intervention created a major change in the status quo of the political 
opportunity structure, giving various Islamist groups the impetus to rally greater numbers 
to their cause.  In the early 1970s, some of these groups were already advocating a jihad 
against the government; however, “this call produced no response”96 and a coordinated 
attack by the Islamists in 1975 met with defeat as there was no popular support for their 
efforts.  After December 1979, however, the immediate problem of the Soviet Army 
presented a new political opportunity for the Islamist groups to recruit more of the 
population, now sufficiently angered to the point of taking action, to answer their calls for 
jihad.  The invasion also emboldened groups and leaders with more traditional or 
moderate positions to organize collective action against the intruder in order to make 
changes in the status quo. 
2. The Soviet Counterinsurgency:  Repression, Genocide and Backlash 
Faced with a growing resistance, the Soviets were caught in what Ronald 
Francisco has called “The Dictator’s Dilemma,” which is essentially a question of the 
degree of repression a regime needs to implement to squash dissent.97  Having failed to 
gain popular support for their reforms, the Soviets and their Afghan partners took 
repression to the extreme and “embarked on a program of genocide.”98  Unable to 
squelch the resistance, the Soviets responded by indiscriminately decimating the Afghan 
population with shelling, aerial mining and chemical weapons, as well as scorched earth 
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tactics, in an effort to get the population to “pressure the mujahadeen not to attack the 
invaders.”99  Faced with the choice of dying from a Soviet bombardment or running to 
the hills to join the mujahadeen, many Afghans would follow Mohammad Hafez’s 
assertion that a population that has gone through a period of institutional exclusion will 
mobilize.  When this mobilized population faces reactive indiscriminate repression and is 
left without peaceful alternatives, a large-scale rebellion is likely to ensue.100 
Such heavy-handed approaches by the Soviets resulted in a backlash from the 
Afghans since “consistent repression necessarily increases the amount of revolutionary 
zeal”101 in a population.  While there had been resistance to the communist reforms being 
made when the PDPA reigned in Kabul, it was the indiscriminate and violent repression 
carried out by the PDPA and later the Soviets which created the necessity and 
justification, in the mind of the Afghan population, to collectively take up arms against 
the invaders.  Now the enemy was not only a godless invader, but was also seen as 
inordinately cruel, requiring little, if any, exaggeration to convince the population of the 
need to take part in jihad against such an evil power. 
While the purity of the initial call to jihad was essential to contrast the righteous 
mujahadeen with the godless communists, over the course of the decade of resistance 
“ideological frontiers between Islamists and fundamentalists had a tendency to become 
blurred.”102  Likewise, the support provided to these groups pragmatically overlooked 
their proclaimed ideologies in the interest of bringing down the Soviet bear.  The 
collective desire to defeat the Soviets provided the political opportunity for the various 
groups, both fundamentalist and traditionalist, to capture resources from external sources 
that, in the absence of the Soviet invasion, might not have rendered such support 
otherwise. 
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C. MOBILIZING FOR THE JIHAD:  THE IMPORTANCE OF MOSQUES, 
MULLAHS AND ISLAMIST PARTIES 
The Islamic religious establishment in Afghanistan had been an integral part of 
culture and politics before the communist coup.  Prior to the PDPA takeover, “Afghan 
monarchs enjoyed the support of the religious establishment”103 and the ulema, the 
professional, scholarly religious class, were connected with the affairs of the state. In 
fact, most of them were on the state’s payroll.  For the PDPA, “a new social order could 
not be but in place until the old order had been liquidated.”104 This meant dismembering 
the traditional structures of Afghan society, including its religious component. 
The communist coup of 1973 established a form of government that bypassed 
these traditional structures in order to establish a new Afghan state modeled after the 
Soviet Union.  Since communism views religions as antiquated — one of Marxism’s 
tenets being that religion only serves as an opiate to the masses, theoretically keeping the 
masses compliant and lethargic while the elites of society took advantage of their 
ignorant piety — the Afghan religious establishment of ulema and mullahs had to be 
placed on the sidelines. 
1. The Local Afghan Jihad 
In the rural areas, the mullahs — “religious functionaries with little or no 
education”105 who oversaw the daily lives of the rural population — were seen as the 
most qualified “to interpret government policies” and the “natural arbitrator of communal 
values,”106 highlighting their influence on the life of the average Afghan.  There was not 
necessarily a close structural connection between the ulema and the mullahs, but each had 
significant influence at their respective levels of society. 
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Rather than compromise their ideology, and perhaps framing their arguments for 
reform to account for these traditional religious power brokers, the communists grossly 
misread the population.  They made enemies of the very leaders who had the credentials 
to undercut their every move and their “attacks against respected religious figures were 
viewed as assaults against the culture at large and caused…a recessive part of cultural 
identity (i.e., being Muslims) to become the dominant feature.”107  Later in the conflict, 
the communist regime would eventually realize their error and attempt to become “the 
protector of Islam.”  In an interesting turn of events, the communists recognized the 
potency of jihad ideology and, “the struggle against the guerillas became a jihad.”108 
Initial resistance “did not mobilize against the communist government in the 
name of an ideology,”109 but the anti-Soviet cause found its roots in religious 
organizations from the start.  Throughout the reign of the PDPA and following the Soviet 
invasion, the communists had marginalized the power base of the traditional tribal 
structure as well as making “attempts to neutralize the religious factor in public 
perception”110 by castigating the the ulema, or religious elite.  While in the seat of 
government, the PDPA made significant adjustments in property rights, the role of 
women and other changes, forcibly adjusting the Afghan way of life almost overnight 
“without the complicity and support of established religious figures to whom the people 
looked for advice and consent.”111 
Prior to the Soviet invasion, the religious institutions served as the base for 
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Kabul in the spring of 1979.  These revolts were not well-organized initially, but there 
was a “collective definition of targets”112 and a clear influence by the religious 
establishment on the rebellion: 
On the morning of 15 March the peasants of the surrounding area gathered 
around the mosques together with the townsmen and, encouraged by the 
mullahs, converged on Herat, attacking all the symbols of the state and of 
communism indiscriminately.113 
Even the local Afghan army garrison joined this revolt.  As in prior rebellions, such as 
those against the British, the mullahs had provided the rhetoric and “an efficient network 
for the transmission of information”114 needed to flesh out the forces that would 
physically wage the jihad. 
The mullahs and ulema were the backbone of the resistance; as spiritual leaders, 
they were the only individuals with the recognized authority to call for a jihad.  The 
mullahs had different degrees of power, depending upon the tribal communities in which 
they served.  Those mullahs who operated amongst the Pushtun tribes, the largest 
ethnicity group in Afghanistan115, typically were involved only in “clerical duties.” 
However, for the Pushtuns, in the event of a war, “the leadership role…shifts from the 
Khan to the mullah.”116  The standing and importance of these religious leaders increased 
dramatically as the population recognized that the PDPA had “proven itself to be an 
infidel government,”117 and moved closer to Islam for its sense of identity.  For a 
Marxist, the impossible was about to happen in its Afghanistan experiment: Religion was 
about to become its undoing.   
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2. The Islamist Party:   A New Face for Tradition 
In addition to the traditional mullahs and ulema, various Islamist groups, such as 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami118 or “Islamic Party,”119 also became rallying 
points for anti-PDPA and, later, anti-Soviet actions.  As political actors, the Islamist 
groups had already developed in their ability to organize collective action for protest and 
even violence.  The Islamist groups were the first to wage an “armed struggle” against the 
Kabul regime in 1973 as it was warming up to the communists.  As such, “they had 
acquired legitimacy,”120 and were a natural starting point for those who wanted to join 
the resistance.  Olivier Roy notes a key difference in the character of the various 
uprisings started by ordinary Afghans unaffiliated with Islamist organizations; they were 
“spontaneous.”  In contrast, the resistance efforts by the Islamist groups “tended to go 
underground” in order to conduct more organized and deliberate actions.121 
While the call for a jihad resonated across Afghanistan, it is an exaggeration to 
say that the resistance was united throughout the campaign against the Soviets.  The 
mobilization for the Afghan jihad, however, should be seen more as a series of what one 
SMT author calls “micro mobilizations”122 of individuals who would band together or 
operate independently of each other with their only common ground being that they had 
experienced similar grievances stemming from a shared foe.  The Soviet invasion created 
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the type of “national crisis” in which “Islam has provided the rallying point for  
otherwise disunited groups”123 to band together.  
Attempts at alliances were made in response to internal pressure from Afghan 
refugees who “demanded a united front to coordinate military activities.”  These various 
alliances took on titles such as the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, the 
Union of the Three, the Union of the Seven and the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen; 
however, none of these was “destined to last.”124  Nonetheless, these groups, while they 
never truly allied for any extended period of time, did partner occasionally for mutual 
support and “showed an opposition to foreign intruders that transcended religious, 
linguistic, and ethnic boundaries.”125  Although these groups shared a hatred for the 
Soviet Union, they had different visions of what Afghanistan should look like after the 
atheists were driven out. 
3. Universal Jihad:  The Global Ummah Mobilizes for the Afghan Cause 
The various Afghan tribes and groups were not the only individuals mobilized for 
waging jihad.  The call spread into the Arab world through the imams whose messages 
painted the image of the Soviet Union as a godless, atheistic foe who was now treading 
on land that had shamelessly been taken from the Islamic world.  In Saudi Arabia, an ally 
of the United States, the jihad was directly encouraged through the network of Wahhabi 
mosques without fear of losing American support.  In response, young Arab men rallied 
to the call. The mosques became recruitment centers, and “Jeddah became a transit 
station for…the Afghan jihad.”126  For the Saudi political leadership, the consequence of 
fanning Wahhabi activism for the jihad was that it now had to sugarcoat its relationship 
with the United States, “making sure that the Soviet Union would replace America as 
their principal scapegoat.”127 
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In other Arab nations with ties with the Soviet Union, mobilization for the jihad 
became problematic under the auspices of the state.  This was evidenced by the decision 
of the January 1981 Organization of the Islamic Conference to not declare a jihad on 
behalf of Afghanistan.128  While these Muslim states refused to call a jihad for the 
Afghan cause, “transnational Islamic religious networks”129 had no qualms about 
supporting a holy war against the atheistic Soviet Union. 
Networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood were already established in these 
countries in opposition to their regimes.  The opportunity to rally to the cause of fellow 
Muslims, in contrast to the inaction of their regimes, helped build their Islamist 
credentials.  The ideology of jihad would resound clearly through these organizations and 
the purity of fighting for an Islamic cause on behalf of their coreligionists would be an 
opportunity that many enthusiastically could not refuse. 
D. FRAMING THE AFGHAN JIHAD:  EXCLUSIVE IDEOLOGY AND 
PRAGMATIC COMPROMISE 
During the Afghan Jihad, a local resistance would take place as well as draw in 
external forces that would rally along religious lines to fight a political foe in a foreign 
land.  Following the Soviet invasion, a local resistance had broken out among the 
Afghans yet they were lacking sufficient resources and organization to wage war 
effectively.  Fortunately for the Afghan resistance, their struggle would not go unnoticed 
by the other world superpower and rival of the Soviet Union: the United States.  The 
truism that my enemies’ enemy is my friend provided the Afghan resistance several 
unique marriages of opportunity with some unlikely partners.  
Although the Soviets claimed to have been invited by the PDPA, their actions 
broadcast to the world a different message.  The invasion was condemned by the United 
States and other Western nations.  Even Hollywood supported the Afghan Jihad as James 
Bond,130 Rambo131 and others took up arms with the mujahadeen against the Soviets on 
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the silver screen.  A range of other unlikely international actors, including China, Iran132  
and Egypt133 also indirectly supported the resistance.  The various religious orders, 
including the Sufis,134 Sunnis, Shi’a, and various Islamist organizations such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah, also found sympathy or political opportunity with 
the anti-Soviet cause.  These nations and groups tended to back Afghan groups that 
shared their ideological visions. 
The success of the Afghan Jihad would depend upon framing the cause of the 
Afghan resistance such that it would enable the mobilization of a fighting force as well as 
provide for the effective organization and equipping of that force.  Ironically, while the 
framing for jihad itself would call for the most extreme type of pious devotion, the 
supplying of the jihad would require some ideological compromise. 
1. Clash of Ideologies:  Communism versus Islam 
Instead of rallying to the communist calls spouted from the regime in Kabul — to 
stand up to Western imperialism — the Afghans were turning to Islam.  While divided 
along ethnic, tribal and religious lines, they still found sanctuary in their religious 
institutions and leaders, even more so as their way of life was being forcibly changed to 
align Afghan life with the ideology of communism. 
The leftist Afghan groups, which had helped with the Marxist coup, saw 
opportunity in the new changes. However, the majority of Afghans only saw their culture 
being decimated and their property being redistributed without receiving anything in 
return, all in the name of some new vision.  Although the PDPA vanguard had been able 
to seize Kabul, the masses did not rally to their cause as had occurred in other communist 
revolutions.  Rather than endearing themselves to the Afghan population by revealing the  
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great utopian tenets of Marxist socialism, the communist regime was creating enemies 
among a religious leadership who could truly mobilize the masses under an ideology that 
was everything but an opiate. 
The sudden and drastic changes brought on with the reforms “deeply effected the 
so called traditional population”135 who did not see the changes in the same light as the 
regime had hoped.  The Soviet invasion only galvanized the population further against 
the foreign ideology of communism.  In response to force-fed communism, the 
population returned to traditional Islam, as well as a new Islamist ideology that had 
developed from “a campus study group…into a powerful…political party.”136  Both 
traditional Islam and its fundamentalist variant would help to weaponize the religious 
organizations against the Soviets and their puppet regime in Kabul. 
Islam had traditionally served to legitimize the Afghan political system.  When it 
was suddenly sidelined by the PDPA, and later the Soviets, it became the voice of dissent 
for those that had not bought into the communist frames.  When the Afghan ulema 
responded, they spoke to the conscience and emotions of individual Muslims by tapping 
into the powerful rhetoric and framing potential of jihad ideology.  The presence of the 
Soviets, coupled with their repressive treatment of the Afghans, gave credence to the 
picture of them as unholy invaders and ones whom every true Muslim had a personal 
duty to fight.  When couched in jihad terminology, the “the rebellion took on a universal 
nature,”137 and the godless Soviets became the religious target for individuals to 
participate against in collective action. 
Whether the frame of jihad ideology against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul 
would have eventually led to a full scale mobilization against the PDPA had the Soviets 
not invaded is an interesting historical “what if” debate.  The failure of the Islamist revolt 
to gather popular support in 1975 perhaps demonstrates that their ideology would  
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continue to fall on deaf ears.  It is apparent, however, that the Soviet invasion 
unquestionably validated the frame that infidel foreigners were killing the ummah and the 
faithful needed to mobilize and defend them. 
As the advocates who had identified the communist threat from the beginning, the 
Islamists could frame themselves as the truth tellers.  Instead of being the boy who cried 
wolf, they were now seen as the protectors of the country — somewhat like Winston 
Churchill who, having been sidelined as a warmonger, was vindicated and thrust into 
power after Hitler’s invasion of Poland. Churchill was viewed as the one who had seen 
the writing on the wall since the beginning. 
An important part of framing the call for jihad was the understanding that it was a 
call for integrity and purity, in contrast to the face of evil.  While the communist ideology 
may in time have resonated with the population, the conduct of the regime in 
implementing their reforms was seen as a “purposeful falsehood” and a “moral outrage 
legitimating the act of rebellion.”138  The conduct of the mujahadeen during the course of 
the Afghan jihad was by no means above reproach; however, for the sake of the initial 
call to arms, the jihad had to be viewed as a just and holy war, framed in terms of good 
and evil.  The ideology needed to be convincing enough to draw recruits willing to rise 
up and lay down their lives for their fellow Muslims, who were being slaughtered by a 
cruel oppressor.  What better way to draw recruits willing to kill and die in the name of 
God than to show them that their enemy is a truly godless foe? 
2. The Domestic Jihad:  Cultural Framing within Afghanistan 
In the Afghan case, the Soviet invasion gave clear evidence of the need to wage a 
defensive jihad, giving the rebellion a religious component that would stir the masses to 
action.  The framing for the jihad inside Afghanistan needed to integrate two ideological 
components: 
Islam provided the symbolic background and the basis for legitimization, 
but traditional tribal values structured the actual response, a fact the  
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narrator also understood as he invoked ancestral memory in conjunction 
with Islamic law charging the tribesmen with their responsibility to God 
and their fathers.139 
Familiar myths were discussed, and tapes and pamphlets were distributed throughout 
Afghanistan to give the ideology legs.  The urgency of the call to jihad grew in 
proportion with the oppression of the regime. 
a. Pamphlets and Tapes:  The Medium as Part of the Message 
In the decade prior to the Afghan Jihad, Islamist groups distributed 
pamphlets against the Afghan regime as a component of their recruiting strategy.  These 
pamphlets “awakened student interest in Islam in the late 1960s.”140  In their pursuit of a 
following, they were locked in an ideological tug-of-war with the ideas “being advanced 
by the rival Marxist groups”141 who were also advocating changes in the government.  
Although the literacy rate in Afghanistan was quite low, pamphlets were distributed 
throughout the country to pass on the message of resistance to the regime in Kabul 
through the power of Islam.  Those who could read were able to pass on the message to 
those who could not, and so the ideology was able to spread. 
The secret distribution of these pamphlets and tapes throughout 
Afghanistan added to the subversive nature of the anti-regime cause. The very need for 
stealth demonstrated the oppressive nature of the regime; being caught with one 
“constituted an act of treason.”142  These pamphlets were specifically designed for 
distribution and could be readily “disposed of if necessary.”  The Hezb-i Islami pamphlet, 
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improvement upon earlier pamphlets.  These pamphlets and their “subversive 
potential”143 would help frame the covert nature of the resistance and quicken the 
spreading of the message.  
Perhaps the most important contribution of these pamphlets was that they 
“brought Islam out of the traditional madrasahs.”144  These pamphlets provided a 
resource for students and others to refer to when debating with other students or for 
personal development.  Not only did they provide guidance for personal living in line 
with Islamic tenets, but they laid the ideological foundations for revolution under the 
banner of jihad. 
b. Historical Foundations and the Myths of Jihad 
Some of these pamphlets were arguably for the “perpetuation of the party 
itself,”145 in the case of Hezb-i Islami, but much of the propaganda was geared towards 
educating the local populations on the “discourse and values that are considered 
appropriate for a time of jihad.”146  The tapes and pamphlets expounded familiar myths 
about jihad at the time of Mohammad, designed in a dramatic format with emotional 
music such that listeners often responded in tears.  One story, which demonstrated a 
change in the role of women during times of jihad, speaks of a woman named Nasia 
whose son had been killed at the battle of Uhud.  During the same battle, she avenged his 
death by cutting his killer in half with a sword.  For this, she received the praise of 
Mohammad, including a promise that she would be his neighbor in paradise.147  
These tapes and pamphlets prepared the Afghans for war.  Myths, such as 
the story of Nasia, would have similar emotional effects on the population — much like 
the story of Molly Pitcher, who had taken her husband’s place in a cannon crew after he 
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had fallen at the battle of Monmouth, would have had during the American Revolution.  
Such stories gave the ideology a personal and physical aspect that the population could 
relate to and emulate. 
3. The Afghan Jihad Becomes Universal:  Framing the Global Ummah 
One of the ideologues who joined the cause of the Afghan jihad was a Palestinian 
cleric named Sheik Abdullah Azzam.  A trained member of the ulema, the Islamic clergy, 
he spoke with religious authority to a global audience.148  To aid their cause, Azzam 
crafted “the legend of the Afghan holy warriors” such that it could be “packaged and sold 
all over the world.”149  Coming to the aid of the Afghans was not necessarily a sufficient 
cause to rally warriors from a global population.  When Azzam made it an Islamic issue, 
however, it became “not simply an ideological alternative…but a theological and political 
imperative.”150  Writing for a universal Muslim audience, his ideas resonated in mosques 
throughout the world.  He unified his audience by fanning the flames of the “Islamic 
World Jihad movement” as a place where “all races participated…and the goal was one:  
that the word of Allah is raised the highest.”151  While his religious credentials were 
arguably limited, Azzam aimed to draw on established Islamic institutions to mobilize a 
force that could liberate Afghanistan. 
As part of his framing techniques to make the Afghan Jihad a universal Islamic 
cause, Azzam needed to describe the urgency of the situation, ensuring that for the 
mujahadeen, the jihad remained a pure battle being waged for the sake of the Muslim 
ummah as a whole.  The rhetoric of fundamentalism can be found when he claims that the 
nations “die only with their desires and their lusts,” and the ummah can only continue to 
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exist by “spreading this divine ideology and implanting it into the real world.”  For 
Azzam, the fundamentals of the faith were found in “the ink of its scholars and the blood 
of its martyrs,” and it would be through their efforts that the ummah will be “rescued 
from their decline.”152   
Azzam praises the efforts of a small group of holy warriors as, “the cream of the 
cream of the cream,”153 but he was using them as an example to motivate his broader 
audience.  The Afghan mujahadeen, who had responded to a domestic call against a 
direct threat, had become the role model for the universal ummah.  For the global 
ummah, “Afghanistan meant little to them, but the faith…meant a great deal.”154  This 
framing ensured that the anti-Soviet jihad was not seen as only an Afghan resistance 
movement and helped avoid the perception that the mujahadeen were mere pawns of the 
United States. 
Sheikh Azzam used religious language to formulate arguments for the Afghan 
Jihad.  He clearly identified and charged his audience with making the ultimate sacrifice 
for the sake of the cause.  While Azzam incorporated what may be termed fundamentalist 
rhetoric that reifies the boundary lines between a group and those outside of the group, he 
sought to remove ideological barriers between the Arab and Afghan coreligionists to rally 
a broader audience for a specific objective of liberating the country of Afghanistan.  He 
included references to the Qur’an and hadith, but collective violence, not the 
“inerrancy”155 of fundamentalism, was his goal.  Azzam effectively rallied large numbers 
to join the anti-Soviet jihad and “form a line against the retreat of their religion,”156  
More importantly, however, he was able to align them with like-minded organizations 
that could provide both the financial and military resources needed for waging a guerilla 
war against a super power. 
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E. JIHAD IN THE HANDS OF INFIDELS:  ALLIANCES OF 
OPPORTUNITY 
The universal resonance of the Afghan Jihad was evidenced by the young men 
from across the Muslim world who answered the call to arms and made their way to 
Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the struggle against the Soviets.  Unwilling to send its 
own troops into the fray for fear of starting World War III, the United States “had to 
remain indirect via proxies”157 in its fight against the Soviets.  The Afghan Jihad made it 
possible for the United States to activate alliances with groups already established in 
Afghanistan and various Muslim groups throughout the world. 
As the Afghan resistance forces took on the communist infidels, they were in fact 
aligning themselves with the United States and other Western nations.  The United States 
is a distinctly non-Islamic nation, frequently referred to by extremist Islamic groups with 
the inflammatory moniker, Great Satan.158  Although the alliance with the United States 
was kept somewhat secretive, the money, equipment and, more importantly, the 
American personnel involved in supporting the jihad gave it a dynamic that contrasts 
with more fundamentalist interpretations of jihad.  War, however, has an interesting way 
of bringing people together. 
While the end user may have seen himself as a holy warrior removed from the 
trappings of the non-Islamic world, the weapons he was using had been paid for and 
passed on to him through a convoluted network of partners whose ideologies were more 
similar to his enemies’ than his own.  That the Christian/Western United States, 
Communist China, and an Israel-friendly Egypt took part in supporting the jihad is a 
political enigma.  As the politics of supporting the jihad were a confounding paradox, so 
also did the supply of weapons and equipment to support the Afghan resistance become a 
logistical nightmare.  Weapons shipments came through the Pakistani port of Karachi, the 
Wakhan Corridor with China and various other ports of entry.  After arriving in Pakistan, 
the weapons were distributed through a network overseen by the Pakistani Inter Service 
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Intelligence (ISI),159 who moved them to locations in Peshawar and Quetta before 
passing them on to the various groups of mujahadeen.160  Mohammad Yousaf, a 
Pakistani Army officer involved in managing the ISI support to the mujahadeen, captures 
some of the paradox of the Afghan Jihad in discussing how Israel was also a source of 
weapons:  
I had no idea that Israel was a source until quite recently, as, had it been 
known, there would have been considerable trouble with the Arab nations.  
It would not have been acceptable to wage a Jehad with weapons bought 
from Israel.161 
Financial support for the Islamist parties, however, was directly routed to them through 
their own networks.162  By this means, the fundamentalist groups could keep themselves 
detached from alliances with infidels. 
The need for support created somewhat of a two-way ideological dilemma for 
both the United States and some of the Islamist groups in that not all of them reached the 
same agreement on how to work with the non-Muslim infidels who were supporting the 
Afghan cause, particularly the United States: 
While the fundamentalist groups command more following, the U.S. 
seems unwilling to develop any rapprochement with them…The 
fundamentalists’ attitudes towards the U.S. differ.  Hikmatyar is strictly 
against accepting any aid from the U.S., while Rabbani, Sayaf and Khalis 
recognize the necessity of unconditional aid.163 
As this example demonstrates, even in a fight against the superpower might of the Soviet 
Union, the question of support from infidels drew a dividing line amongst the 
fundamentalist groups.  Ideological purity for the Hezb-i Islami apparently outweighed 
the practical needs of its jihad. 
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The Afghan Jihad example also points to the challenge that Islamic regimes have 
had in waging jihad alongside non-Muslims, as demonstrated by the Saudis who found it 
necessary to protect their “American ally…against the wrath of Sunni activists.”164  
Essentially, the Saudi regime realized that they needed to placate the more fundamental 
Islamists by painting the Soviet Union as a greater evil than the United States.  By 
keeping their presence to a minimum during the jihad in order to avoid direct combat 
with the Soviets, the Americans were inadvertently maintaining the ideological purity of 
the jihad.  In contrast, the Soviets, with a physical presence on the ground, were viewed 
as the real imperialists, validating the frame that presented them as the greatest threat — a 
frame, ironically, they had tried to pin on the United States. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Afghan jihad is a rich case study for the tenets of SMT.  In reviewing the 
various books and articles on the subject, the events, organizations and personalities that 
are endemic to this time period make much more sense when applying the various 
concepts and theses that seek to explain why groups mobilize.  The religious character of 
the Afghan jihad, and its effectiveness at mobilizing and sustaining the struggle over a 
decade of Soviet occupation, validates the importance of studying the religious and 
ideological components of collective action. 
The event that triggered the Afghan jihad, the Soviet invasion, provided the 
impetus for groups who were already operating against an unpopular regime to come to 
the forefront.  The invasion provided the change in the political opportunity structure in 
which these groups would be legitimized as the voice of resistance in Afghanistan.  As 
the Soviets responded with a level of repression that has been called genocide, their 
presence was even more indicative of the evil that the jihad spoke against.  To challenge 
this evil, the Afghans turned to their religious institutions and the Islamist groups, and the 
rebellion grew. 
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The Afghan struggle against the Soviet Union became unique as a rebellion when 
jihad ideology was activated.  What had heretofore been a war of liberation for the 
Afghan population, now became a spiritual battle.  As a spiritual battle, the plight of the 
Afghans inspired Islamic organizations across the Muslim world to come to their aid.  
Not only did fellow Muslims come to the aid of the mujahadeen, but several other 
powers, who had a mutual interest in fighting the Soviet Union, found benefit in 
empowering the Islamist groups to fight on their behalf.  While these alliances may have 
been problematic under different circumstances, they became the lifeblood for the 
mujahadeen. 
The framing of the Afghan jihad as a universal struggle incumbent upon all good 
Muslims to contribute to, became a stepping off point for jihad ideology and a validation 
of its mobilizing effectiveness.  As the ideologues that had generated support for the 
Afghan jihad sought to consolidate their gains, they completed the frame by transferring 
from a narrative of the underdog to the narrative of the conquering holy warriors.  In their 
estimation, “the jihad is seen to have assumed a global role by participating in the Cold 
War.”165  While the Afghans’ coalitions, which had ousted the Soviets, now spiraled into 
an internecine fight for control of Afghanistan, the Arab mujahadeen began to return to 
their home countries.  As the ideology was transforming, the Afghan jihad would also 
provide the cadres for a new form of jihad. 
                                                 
165 Devji, 28. 
 51
IV. TAKING JIHAD OUT OF THE HANDS OF INFIDELS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter looks at how the global jihad has adopted the universal call of the 
Afghan jihad and has transformed within the paradigm of globalization through a process 
of weaponization.  This process of weaponization, or “radicalization,” under the auspices 
of a jihad has taken place at different periods of time and under various circumstances.  
“Radicalization is not unique to Islam nor is it a new phenomenon.”166 Therefore, 
unraveling this process is crucial to understanding how it came about.  Within the social 
sciences, the school of Social Mobilization Theory (SMT) has developed several 
arguments pertaining to causal relationships, which are useful for analyzing the 
formations and trajectories of groups who want to change the status quo in their societies.  
As discussed in the prior chapters, Robinson’s summation of SMT can be boiled down to 
three main causal variables which are linked together:  “changes in political opportunity 
structures,” “mobilizing structures,” and “cultural framing.”167  Taking this framework 
and applying it to the global jihad demonstrates that globalization provides the 
opportunity for all three aspects of SMT theory to work in the weaponization of jihad 
ideology. 
B. GLOBALIZATION’S EVER CHANGING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
The study of globalization includes literature that both heralds the opportunities 
and warns of the impending disasters that the phenomenon might bring.  The proclaimed 
benefits of global connectedness include greater economic opportunities, as well as the 
potential to create peace through greater transparency and the sharing of ideas.  Some see 
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a possibility for “the advancement of common human standards and equality”168 and the 
breaking down of ideological and national boundaries, which will bring universal 
harmony to the planet. 
At the same time, some of the literature also decries the fears of a world without 
financial barriers, where fortunes may be lost in milliseconds as the interconnectedness of 
markets may lead to simultaneous economic collapse.  The flow of the new wealth from 
these markets will only benefit those who are already wealthy and create a world where 
the “disparity between developed and developing nations…fuels frustrated 
expectations…and heightened communal tensions.”169  Likewise, globalization has been 
blamed for generating a “New Security Dilemma,”170 which paints the future as a world 
where the international system is turned upside down, and terrorist organizations are able 
to establish networks capable of unleashing havoc with weapons of mass destruction or 
homemade explosive devices using instructions garnered from the Internet.   
Each argument has its merit, but what is most apparent is that globalization 
provides opportunities.  The obvious hypocrisy of networked global “anti-globalization 
protests”171 reveals that even those who view globalization as an evil must embrace the 
thing they hate in order to be effective.  The difficulties of trying to identify what a 
completely networked world will look like are too numerous to name here.  Whether 
these opportunities lead to increased peace and cooperation among peoples or to 
increased violence and instability remains to be seen. The future will undoubtedly 
provide cases that can support either viewpoint. 
According to SMT, changes in political opportunity structures provide the 
opportunity for political actors, including groups that embrace violence, to insert 
themselves into the political realm in order to make changes to the status quo as they see 
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fit.  These changes in political opportunity structures are phenomenon associated with the 
state level of analysis, where opportunities for political changes are associated with 
interstate wars, drastic changes in the world economy, or other major pressures on the 
structure of a state.  While the word globalization has become a sort of panacea for a 
multitude of new economic, social, political and technological trends, the phenomenon 
does provide for the opportunity to view these SMT variables at work. 
C. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES:  THE GLOBAL UMMAH 
Under SMT, organizations wanting to enact change frequently capitalize on the 
tangible and intangible assets that other existing organizations, such as religious groups, 
social networks and family relationships, can provide — which may be used to help 
further their cause.  In the edited volume, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, Quintan Wiktorowicz looks at “the mobilization of contention to support 
Muslim causes”172 in a variety of Islamic movements, providing a bridge between the 
study of collective action and the role of religion in providing resources to such 
movements.  This book and others like it — which are able to look at Islam as a source 
for the political/ideological component of movements and not just an end in itself — help 
in asking better questions about the organizations and the forces that drive them. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the concept of the ummah existed long before 
the paradigm of globalization.  The Internet, however, provides the tool that allows this 
imagined community to be realized.  During the Afghan jihad, the structures that 
facilitated the collective action in defense of the ummah against the Soviets included the 
Islamist organizations, as well as tribes that had banded together to take up arms.  
Whereas historic Islam had seen mobilization for jihad under state-like institutions such 
as armies, now sub-state actors were taking the lead in calling for jihad.  Within the 
paradigm of globalization, the social networks that may be tapped into for resources may 
not be as locally obvious as they had been in Afghanistan. There is opportunity for 
mobilization nonetheless.  In the twenty-first century, the global ummah becomes the 
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target audience for activation.  This is the continuation of a process that began during the 
Afghan jihad when Arabs were called from around the world to defend their fellow 
Muslims. 
This new global ummah has developed in cyberspace.  Some of its members have 
latched onto and continued the propagation of the virulent strain of jihad that had been 
revived during the Afghan jihad. 
A small, exclusive group of Arabic-language Web sites now forms the 
core of this virtual community. These forums serve as the point of 
interaction for active members and passive supporters worldwide. A 
crucial sense of community is fostered within these spaces, with members 
signing on daily to discuss the ongoing trials and tribulations of the 
international Jihad, develop consensus on current events, engage in 
theological debates, and even plan hypothetical attacks. This presence, 
dubbed "the Electronic Jihad" by its members, is fast coalescing into a 
virtual community of believers, steadily growing in strength, influence, 
and technological sophistication, and now proving as indispensable to the 
global jihadi movement as are guns and bombs.173 
Attempting to classify this “small, exclusive group” in SMT terminology is difficult. 
SMT looks at localized “repressive political environments,”174 but it is a phenomenon 
that needs to continue being grappled with in the field of study nonetheless. This is 
especially true as the global ideology is adapted to fit local struggles or local actions are 
touted as a component of the global jihad. 
1. Small Group Jihad 
In the current iteration of the jihad, “the ubiquity of the Internet means that small 
terrorist groups can have a global cyber presence that rivals that of much larger 
organizations.”175  Of course the ability to reach this audience is dependent upon that 
audience’s ability to access the Internet.  Another challenge is the literacy rate among 
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potential actors.  Within the paradigm of globalization, however, these challenges are 
reduced exponentially as technology becomes more available, spreading ever farther into 
the remote regions of the world.  The number of Internet-savvy individuals is also 
increasing, and live video feeds of the global jihad in action make literacy a non-
requirement.  The resulting effect on Islam is that: 
The more traditional forms of Muslim authority are broken down within 
the jihad; therefore, the more like other global movements such as 
environmentalism or the anti-globalization protests does Islam become.176 
While this global ummah lacks the local religious infrastructures, which are an 
essential component of social mobilization, the availability of the ideology provides 
inspiration and an ideological foundation for any would-be participants to join — either 
as part of a small group or as an individual.  While the ideology may be available 
globally, it does not become a spark leading to weaponization unless it finds an audience 
where its message resonates. 
Various sites on the Internet provide ideological and technical guidance to 
potential warriors who claim to fight under the banner of jihad.  For instance, the 
proliferation of information on the manufacture and use of Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED) as well as chemical and biological weapons via the Internet has allowed these self-
proclaimed global jihadis to take full advantage of the lessons learned by their imagined 
comrades in arms on the battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.  A recent survey 
of a number of these jihad Web sites indicates that the majority of visits to these Web 
sites come from the Middle East (78 percent).177  Although the global jihad has a 
universal following, as this study indicates, the majority of interest in its tenets still 
resides in the geographical regions of the historic jihad. 
The effectiveness of small group jihad in producing, hinges on the competence of 
that group in planning, organizing, and equipping for their attacks.  As the Christian 
Patriots, Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols, demonstrated in Oklahoma City in 1995, it 
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does not take an army or a massive military industrial complex to have the capacity to kill 
a lot of people.178  The “second-deadliest terrorist attack in modern history,”179 the 1978 
Cinema Rex fire that was started by a small group of revolutionary Shiites in Abadan, 
Iran, killed 377 people.  The power of small group jihad has numerous historic examples 
to draw from — both internal and external to the practice of global jihad ideology.  
2. Individual Jihad 
At its purist level, the jihad is supposed to be a deeply personal, individual 
struggle.  This thread has been woven throughout the history of jihad.  When the jihad 
has been militarized, the battles were still in the hands of individuals, whether they were 
part of an army, militia or a small group.  Within the ideology of the global jihad, the 
individual is also pressed to contribute, whether as part of a group or to take on solo 
missions as a physical representation of this struggle.  In today’s globalized world, “the 
transformation of geo-politics into metaphysics is what makes the practices of holy war 
ethical,”180 personalizing the struggle as a religious quest.  The ethical nature of jihad 
ideology is an important if not sufficient component for understanding an individual’s 
decision to partake in the jihad.  While today’s individual mujahadeen may not be 
shoulder to shoulder or sharing a foxhole with his mujahadeen brothers, as in the jihads 
of the past, his actions are nonetheless framed as part of a larger struggle by the collective 
ummah against the collective non-ummah. 
Individual jihad has historic precedence in foundational cases where jihad has 
been waged for various reasons.  Jihad ideologues, such as Muhammad Hakaymah make 
sure these cases are framed to show their import in changing the course of history.  
Hakaymah keys in on specific individuals such as Sulayman al-Halabi who assassinated 
Kleber, the commander of Napoleon’s expedition in Egypt, heralding it as one of the 
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events which hastened the French “departure from Egypt,”181 and therefore a victory for 
the jihad.  Similar individual actions are framed as being the continuation of a tradition 
that has “recurred throughout Islamic history” as the tool of resistance when the ummah 
has been under attack. 
An individual need not wait to become a member of a cell, but can contribute as 
another of “dozens of individual operations”182 that have taken place throughout the 
world.  Hakaymah provides several individual actions from throughout the Middle East, 
which he attributes to the global jihad as examples to follow.  He praises Salman Khatir 
who “opened fire on his own decision on a number of Jews on the Egyptian-Israeli 
border,” or “an old Moroccan (who) stabbed a dozen French tourists in Morocco.”  His 
list is diverse in both scope and technique, praising individual stabbings and shootings of 
Americans, Europeans, Russians, Jews and collaborators as contributions to the jihad.  He 
even describes how “in the Emirates, the body of an Italian was discovered,” without 
mentioning a perpetrator or motivation, is a demonstration of the power of jihad.   
None of these actions appears to have been controlled by any single group, but 
were simply lumped together in Hakaymah’s list to frame his argument for the merits of 
individual jihad.  By attributing these actions as part of a global jihad carried out by 
individuals, he is attempting to build a sense of unity within the ummah.  That these 
actions may arguably be tied to local struggles and may in some instances perhaps be the 
actions of the criminally insane is apparently irrelevant for Hakaymah’s argument that 
they are somehow all part of a massive movement.  He is placing these individuals 
alongside the heroes of jihads past as a challenge for the global ummah to not sit idle, and 
to join the ranks of a movement that hinges upon their participation. 
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D. GLOBAL JIHAD:  THE FRAME THAT SELLS ITSELF 
Global Islamic violence today is most clearly associated with Al Qaeda and its 
charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden.  While lacking formal religious training, he wields 
a charisma that has made him into a global icon.  His pictures are prominently displayed 
in the homes of those who espouse his ideology.  Seemingly out of deference to Al 
Qaeda’s popularity, even terrorist groups, such as the Algerian Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC)183 changing its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, North Africa, to identify themselves as participants in the global jihad 
franchise.184  In another example of his global image, he served as a kind of virtual 
running mate for an Islamic candidate in the Philippines in 2007.185  A search for the 
name “Bin Laden”186 on Google yielded over one million hits, whereas the word 
“jihad”187 had only 135,000 hits.  As this small search hints at, bin Laden has, in many 
ways, become the frame of reference for the global jihad, perhaps outshining the concept 
of jihad itself with his notoriety. 
Osama bin Laden’s message of global jihad evolved out of the Afghan jihad.  
During that time, bin Laden had seen the effect of Azzam’s call to jihad and Azzam 
“provided a model for the man he would become.”188  As a veteran of the jihad in 
Afghanistan, bin Laden developed credentials that lent themselves to the creation of a 
cult of personality of people willing to follow him.  During the Afghan jihad, Osama 
participated, somewhat, with the established religious system of Saudi Arabia, but now 
works outside of that system.  His message that “whoever is guided by God cannot be 
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misled” resonates with those who accept his criticism of state-sponsored Islam for 
enabling the “unjust crusade campaign of the United States.” 189 
1. Jihad with the Infidels:  An Unacceptable Frame 
The presence of U.S. and other coalition forces on Saudi soil preparing for 
combat against the Iraqi army during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 created a problem 
for Osama, and an affront to what he saw as pure Islam.  Freshly returning from the 
mujahadeen victory over the atheistic superpower might of the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan, he offered to take up jihad against the Iraqis.  He arguably must have seen 
the threat of Saddam Hussein as a small challenge for those fighting the jihad.  Having 
seen the victory that Allah had given the faithful against one superpower, he mocked the 
idea of allying with the infidels as some sort of crutch.  The necessity of relying on the 
United States to protect it from Saddam proved, in Osama’s mind, the weakness and 
corrupt nature of the Saudi regime. 
During the Gulf War in 1991, bin Laden condemned the Saudi regime for “the 
opening of the land of the two holy mosques to the American occupiers” and imprisoning 
“the true ulema,”190 thereby threatening the purity of Islam in his mind.  Blame for the 
decision to allow “the Gulf regimes to depend on the infidels in attacking Saddam 
Hussein”191 was laid at the feet of Sheik bin Baz, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia who 
had issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, to allow the Americans to enter the kingdom.  
Osama framed the relationship as one in which the Saudis, “enlarged the role of bin Baz 
because of…his weakness and flexibility,”192 thereby giving him greater authority to 
legitimize their decisions.  From Osama’s perspective, this was proof that imposter 
ulema, headed by bin Baz, were legitimizing the Saudi regime in a mutually supportive  
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incestuous religious political alliance, and their authority was therefore invalid.  He 
framed himself as incorruptible and unable to be shaken by earthly rulers — in contrast to 
bin Baz’s apparent lack of integrity. 
With corrupt political and religious leadership in charge of the Holy Land, Bin 
Laden charged that they no longer needed to be obeyed.  Five years later, he would issue 
his Declaration of Jihad, hearkening back to a hadith to “expel the Polytheists from the 
Arabian peninsula”193 since this was the source of “the greatest disaster to befall the 
Muslims since the death of the Prophet Muhammad.”194  Framing his jihad as an 
ideologically pure variant, free from the influence of an infidel alliance, would be an 
essential component of legitimizing bin Laden’s campaign against the House of Saud and 
America. 
2. Internet Framing:  The Medium Validates the Message. 
The effectiveness of a message not only consists of its ideological content, but 
also “the textual medium through which ideological pronouncements are reproduced and 
communicated fundamentally affects the way the pronouncements are received and 
understood.”195  For instance, during the Reformation, the printing press had an integral 
role in spreading the message of change being demanded of the religious-political 
establishment.  Not only did the printing press enable the distribution of numerous Bibles 
in common European languages, but it made physically possible one of the key 
revolutionary principles put forth during the Reformation: the Bible was intended to be 
made available and understandable by people at any strata of society, and not just the 
professional religious elite. 
Like the printing press to the Reformation or pamphlets distributed by the Hezb-i 
Islami to the Islamist movements prior to the Afghan jihad, the Internet enables the 
physical manifestation of the ideological tenets of an individual’s jihad, that of personal 
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purity and detachment from corruption.  Not only can the searcher find an imagined 
community to be a part of and a cause to believe in, but now he can also experience an 
imagined personal purity as he participates in individual jihad.  The ideologues who 
promote this type of jihad: 
Currently have firm possession of that battlefield because they understand 
this shift and have crafted and disseminated a narrative that resonates and 
that has served both to energize and expand their ranks.196 
Cyberspace is a new type of terrain on which the warped ideological visions of extremist 
groups can be expounded or moved about to new cyber locations virtually unchecked. 
3. Keeping the Jihad Pure:  Technological Monasticism 
While the Internet provides many resources for terrorist groups, some potential 
problems may also come through the medium of cyberspace: 
Reliance on the Internet also creates the opportunity for outsiders to pose 
as insiders in order to provide misinformation or simply to create doubt 
among the terrorists about who they can trust.197 
This highlights the practical security need to protect the global jihad from infiltration and 
exploitation by security forces.  Not only are external cyber threats challenging the jihad, 
but internal distractions can distort the frame and derail the weaponization process as 
well. 
While there are practical reasons for blocking out cyber intruders, there is also a 
need to shelter those recruits in the embryonic stages of “radicalization” from 
ideologically wavering.  With the need to protect their recruits from outside influences, al 
Qaeda must act in ways similar to that of parents protecting their children from 
pornography and other corrupting influences on the Internet: 
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One of al Qaeda’s goals is to use the Internet to create ‘resistance 
blockades’ in order to prevent Western ideas from “further corrupting 
Islamic institutions, organizations, and ideas.” One technique they use is 
to distribute Internet browsers that have been designed to filter out content 
from undesirable sources (for example, Western media) without the users’ 
knowledge.198 
The idea of the Western media playing the role of Tokyo Rose to the global jihad is not 
taken lightly by its sponsors.  They know they are drawing on a pool of potential recruits 
who could choose from a plethora of competing ideological masters.  This is an ongoing 
challenge for the jihad’s entrepreneurs since “once someone has become an 
insider…continuous interactions are required to maintain the needed level of 
commitment.”199  Although the process is difficult, maintaining the framing purity of 
jihad ideology is crucial for maintaining its relevance and mobilizing capacity for the 
global ummah. 
E. CONCLUSION 
During the Afghan jihad, and while he was a guest of the Taliban, bin Laden was 
tied into organizations that could support his war against America.  Now, however, his 
organization, while still dangerously capable of striking out, is showing signs of what 
some experts would describe as desperation and perhaps the end of a cycle of violence.  
While the Afghan jihad was ultimately successful in galvanizing an army of mujahadeen, 
as well as developing partnerships that supported it through the successful expulsion of 
the Soviets, Al Qaeda still struggles to remove the United States and its “corrupt” partner 
regimes in the Middle East. 
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This chapter summarizes the transformation of jihad ideology as both a 
mobilizing tool used by Islamic nation states as well as the basis for a narrative of dissent 
for groups looking to overthrow the established system.  Throughout the history of jihad, 
the skillful manipulation of the language of jihad as a mobilizing tool by non-Islamic 
nations has effectively rallied Islamic allies.  This apparent compromise, however, has 
frustrated those groups who hold a more extreme version of Islam and see such alliances 
as heretical.  The global jihad, however, maintains its ideological “purity” and avoids 
such entanglements by utilizing the new tools of globalization, specifically the Internet.  
Globalization has enabled these groups to acquire the tools for waging jihad without 
having to form ideologically problematic alliances with those they view as infidels. 
B. ENTANGLING INFIDEL ALLIANCES 
Alliances can be useful when uniting against a common foe, but there are inherent 
difficulties, hence George Washington’s warning to a young United States against 
forming “entangling alliances” with European nations.  Similarly, Islamic leaders seeking 
the military strength of an alliance with an infidel European or Western power have had 
to wrestle with the issue of compromising their sovereignty — and perhaps de-
legitimizing their religious authority. 
Like all wars, wars under the banner of jihad not only need warriors, but also 
require information and resources, since, as Napoleon said, an army marches on its belly.  
Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire with the abolition of the caliphate, the warriors of 
jihad have not always been able to support their struggle with their own resources, but 
have had to draw support from elsewhere.  To reconcile this problem, Islamic regimes, 
such as Saudi Arabia, have sought the approval of the religious community to validate 
their decisions to partner with non-Islamic allies. 
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As the jihad ideology has been a component of many historical conflicts, an 
obvious divergence between the pragmatic jihad of Islamic political regimes and the 
avowedly unadulterated hybrid places adherence to ideology above loyalty to an earthly 
ruler, even if he is a Muslim.  These principles came into being early in the history of the 
Islam.  They were first adopted by the Kharajites as justification for breaking away from 
the main group of Muslims and eventually assassinating the fourth caliph, Ali.  This form 
of ideology has run parallel to the history of traditional state-sanctioned jihad and has 
seen its own transformation.  In its most recent iteration, it has been adopted by non-state 
actors such as Al Qaeda. 
The unlikely partnership of Afghan and Arab mujahadeen with the United States, 
other Western countries, and even Communist China against the Soviet Union 
demonstrates the pragmatic flexibility of jihad ideology in creating partnerships to face 
down foes.  However, as demonstrated in the case of the Afghan jihad, the more virulent 
and pure strain of jihad ideology needed to be kept from the hands of infidels, as 
demonstrated by Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami party and its decision to not take support 
from the United States.  This particular strain of the jihad has an apparently 
uncompromising view of infidel alliances that exceeds even the practical needs of 
fighting a war against a super power. 
In 1991, the Saudis received this blessing in the form of a fatwa, or juridical 
ruling from the religious community, allowing U.S. forces to come to their aid during the 
Gulf War,200 essentially waging jihad with the infidel.  Even with the blessing of the 
religious community, this alliance with an infidel power still discredited them in the eyes 
of those who claimed to represent pure, unadulterated Islam for having become puppets 
to a foreign power.  This was evidenced by Osama bin Laden’s virulent criticism of the 
Saudi decision to enlist the aid of the United States in warding off Saddam Hussein.  The 
purity of the jihad ideology of the Saudi regime had been tainted; an untarnished variant 
was needed to counter this affront to their interpretation of Islam.  To frame this “new” 
jihad, the ideologues would tap into the variant of jihad that had begun with the 
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Kharajites and whose framers, including Wahhab, Qutb, Azzam and bin Laden have held 
sacrosanct to the point of death throughout its legacy. 
C. DE-WEAPONIZING JIHAD IDEOLOGY 
Jihad ideology is actually a series of ideologies that have manifested themselves 
throughout history.  While the jihad of physical warfare has at times been the state-
centric mobilizing frame used to justify Clausewitzian politics by other means for Islamic 
regimes, there has also been a virulent, more idealistic form that has run parallel to the 
jihad of Islamic political authority.  This form of jihad has existed from the beginning of 
Islam and has been woven throughout its history.  Occasionally, this strain of the 
ideology would operate in concert with Islamic regimes while, at other times, it would 
clash.  This is the jihad of the self-righteous underdog who seeks purity over pragmatism.  
It stresses a violent, uncompromising variant of the ideology in order to attract like-
minded individuals to kill and be killed as a measure of devotion “that is more ethical 
than political in nature.”201  Its storied history provides a wealth of myths that various 
entrepreneurs have been able to invoke to frame jihad in their particular situation.  As the 
legacy of jihad is explored, the assumptions that Islam is the sole activator of violent 
action dissipate and reveal a greater complexity in understanding the phenomenon of 
jihad.  Delving into the history of jihad brings to light various other causative factors, 
including political, social and economic forces that were at work when Islamic nations 
decided to go to war. 
The difference, between the recognizably legitimate authority for declaring jihad 
vested in caliphs as leaders of Islamic nation states and the presumptuously assumed 
authority of individuals such as Osama bin Laden, demonstrates the versatility of jihad 
rhetoric.  Similarly, the legitimacy of the mujahadeen struggle against the Soviet Union 
stands in stark contrast to that of terrorists who claim to bear the mantle of global jihad 
against the West and its allies today.  Analyzing this transformation in the ideology of 
jihad demonstrates a desire to maintain legitimacy and purity in the minds of extremists 
claiming to fight in the name of jihad.  Indeed the “bastard phenomena” of the global 
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jihad “depend(s) upon the erosion of traditional religious and political allegiances for its 
very existence.”202  While pragmatism may lead some groups to ideological compromise 
to build alliances or garner support, it is less than ideal, especially for those who must 
maintain an image of infallibility in order to maintain the “integrity” of their version of 
jihad. 
The weaponization of jihad ideology, in comparison with uranium or anthrax 
weaponization, leads to an interesting parallel in the U.S. defense establishment.  In 
March 2007, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) took part in a Future 
Strategic Contexts for WMD-related Planning and Operations workshop.  This workshop 
was a combined effort between the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), DTRA 
and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to “devise a strategy to counter 
the arguments of the radical Islamists and to undermine their appeal to susceptible 
Muslim audiences around the world.”203  This workshop considered various academic 
approaches to get a better understanding of the phenomenon of the radicalization process 
and consider methods of countering its effectiveness. 
In the late 1990s, DTRA was given oversight of the Senator Nunn, Senator Lugar 
(now Senator Obama, Senator Lugar) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.  
The various missions of CTR include “strategic offensive arms elimination; nuclear 
warhead dismantlement; nuclear weapons storage security; chemical weapons 
destruction; biological weapons proliferation prevention; reactor core conversions; 
nuclear material protection, control and accounting; export control initiatives; defense 
conversion.”204  The CTR program essentially pays contractors to reduce the stockpiles 
of weapons of mass destruction and the military/industrial facilities used to build those 
weapons within the former Soviet Union.  With DTRA now participating in discussions 
regarding the ideology of terrorist organizations, the United States is recognizing the 
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need to look at the sources and processes of radicalization as a means of deterring future 
threats.  While the radicalization of jihad ideology is obviously a social phenomenon, as 
opposed to the scientific process of enriching uranium or plutonium, the comparison with 
the weaponization of biologic and nuclear materials is quite apt. 
D. RECOMMENDATION:  RAISING THE COSTS OF JIHAD 
The jihad may be an ideological holy war, but it still takes resources to be 
operationalized in order produce and sustain violent acts.  While there are numerous other 
factors, ranging from vengeance to money, that incite individuals to join these self-
proclaimed jihadi groups, the jihad banner is perhaps the most effective umbrella cause 
under which to rally these individuals.  Ideology is an important, yet intangible resource 
in the weaponization of jihad.  Throughout the transformation of jihad ideology, 
maintaining the purity of the cause has been an important task for those who hold an 
extreme vision of how the world should be.  While individuals such as the 9/11 hijackers 
may engage in impure acts as part of their disguise, or because they believe that their 
pending martyr status will absolve them, ideological integrity remains essential during 
the radicalization process. 
The ideology of the jihad of dissent has existed for centuries, manifesting 
violently in some instances.  As the Kharajites became disgusted with Ali following the 
battle of Siffeen, and the Hezb-i Islami refused to accept support from America during 
the Afghan jihad, so also do the advocates of global jihad insist on maintaining the 
ideological purity of their cause.  Although these groups refuse infidel alliances, they 
nonetheless need resources to wage their struggle.  In the Afghan case, Hezb-i Islami was 
able to receive support from like-minded organizations in Arab countries.  Support now 
flows to various jihad organizations through a mix of organizations sympathetic to their 
cause, allowing them to survive. 
To maintain the purity of jihad on the Internet, the ideologues must proactively 
block out or provide convincing counter arguments to keep those who are undergoing 
radicalization from going astray.  The Internet, while it does provide some anonymity, is 
also penetrable by security forces.  It is also the playground of ideas that compete for the 
 68
attention of potential actors.  Ideologies, such as those found in the global jihad, can 
never be truly eradicated, but they can be discredited or marginalized.  In an interview 
with the Al Jazeera network news organization, bin Laden himself recognizes that U.S. 
strategy includes an effort to “place psychological pressure on the mujahidin and their 
supporters, so that they would forsake the obligation of jihad,”205 by de-legitimizing the 
ideologues of the global jihad.  Clouding the purity of jihad ideology through 
“psychological pressure” is a unique approach, and since it has been identified as a threat 
by bin Laden himself, it is an axis of attack that should continue to be exploited. 
Focusing on those who promote and seek to operationalize the ideology will 
expose the tangible components of the jihad and reveal its vulnerabilities.  Continual 
pressure, in the form of infiltration or cooptation of these sites, forces those who promote 
violent jihad ideologies to increase their cyber security measures, essentially raising the 
cost in terms of time if not money.  While these groups have evidenced a tremendous 
capacity for organizational learning and have significant resources, their resources are not 
endless.  A successful counter ideological strategy needs to involve consistently-applied 
pressure through the medium of the Internet, which will raise the stakes of the game and 
alter the radicalization process.   
 
                                                 
205 Lawrence, 39. 
 69
LIST OF REFERENCES 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah. “Martyrs:  The Building Blocks of Nations,”  
http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_martyrs.htm, last accessed, 
January 3, 2007. 
Bin Laden, Osama. “Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans,” Translation, London Al-
Islah, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) database. 1996.  
Lawrence, Bruce, editor. Messages to the World:  The Statements of Osama Bin Laden.  
Translated by James Howarth. London, Verso, 2005. 
Pickthall, Marmaduke.  The Meaning of the Glorious Koran:  An Explanatory 
Translation by Marmaduke Pickthall.  New York, Dorset Press.  1992. 
RAND Voices of Jihad Database.  




Al Ghazali, Sa’id.  “Islamic Movement versus National Liberation.”  Journal of Palestine 
Studies, volume 17, no. 2, 1988.  http://jstor.org/, August 28, 2006.  last accessed 
Almond, Gabriel A., Scott R. Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, editors.  Strong Religion:  
The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World, Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press, 2003. 
Amin, Tahir. “Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future,” Asian Survey, volume 24, 
No. 4. April 1984. 
Auyero, Javier.  “Relational Riot:  Austerity and Corruption Protest in the Neoliberal Era.”  
Social Movement Studies 2.  no. 2, 2003. 
Amanat, Abbas.  “Russian Intrusion into the Guarded Domain”:  Reflections of a Qajar 
Statesman on European Expansion.”  Journal of the American Oriental Society 113, 
No 1 (January-March 1993). 
Ayubi, Nazih N.  “State Islam and Communal Plurality.”  The Annals of the American 
Academy 524, Political Islam, November 1992.  http://www.jstor.org/ accessed 
September 3, 2006. 
 70
Babinger, Franz., Mehmed the Conqueror and His Times.  Edited by William C. Hickman 
and translated by Ralph Manheim.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1978. 
Bar, Shmuel.  “Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas.”  Center on Islam, 
Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World 1, Paper no. 1, Hudson Institute. 
Washington, D.C., 2006. 
Byman, Daniel L. The Rise of Low-Tech Terrorism. Washington, DC. 
www.washingtonpost.com, last accessed May 6, 2007.  
Cerney, Philip G. “Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma,” Naval War College 
Review, 58(1), Winter 2005, 12. 
Chaffetz, David. “Afghanistan in Turmoil,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944), Volume 56, No. 1.  January 1980. 
Cleveland, William C. A History of the Modern Middle East. 3d edition.  Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2004. 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.  www.ctc.usma.edu. Last accessed May 23, 
2007. 
Dorronsoro, Gilles.  Revolution Unending:  Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present.  Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2005 
Edwards, David B.  “Summoning Muslims: Print, Politics, and Religious Ideology in 
Afghanistan,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (August 1993), 609-628. 
Esposito, John L. “Contemporary Islam:  Reformation or Revolution?” The Islamic 
Threat:  Myth or Reality?  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1993. 
———.  Islam:  the Straight Path.  Revised 3rd edition.  New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
———.  Unholy War:  Terror in the Name of Islam.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2002. 
———.  What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam.  London:  Oxford University Press, 
2002. 
Euben, Roxanne.  “Killing for Politics:  Jihad, Martyrdom and Political Action.”  Political 
Theory 30, No. 1 (February 2002).  http://jstor.org/, accessed August 28, 2006. 
Faisal, Devji. Landscapes of the Jihad:  Militancy, Morality, Modernity.  Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press, 2005. 
Farah, Caesar E. editor. Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire. Kirksville:  
The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993. 
 71
Farr, Grant M. and John G. Merriam, editors.  Afghan Resistance:  The Politics of 
Survival.  Boulder, Colorado:  Westview Press, 1987. 
Firestone, Reuven.  Jihad:  The Origin of Holy War in Islam.  Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
Francisco, Ronald A.  “The Dictator’s Dilemma.”  Repression and Mobilization.  Edited 
by Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, 58-81.  Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 2005 
Gamson, William.  “The Social Psychology of Collective Action.”  Frontiers in Social 
Movement Theory, Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, editors.  New 
Haven:  Yale University Press, 1992. 
Glubb, John Bagot.  The Empire of the Arabs.  Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:  Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1963. 
Hafez, Mohammed M.  “Suicide Terrorism in Iraq:  A Preliminary Assessment of the 
Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, 
2006. 
———.  Why Muslims Rebel:  Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World.  Boulder:  
Lynne Rienner, 2003. 
Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone:  On War in the 21st Century.  St. Paul, 
Zenith Press, 2006. 
Harpviken, Kristian Berg.  “Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State 
Military Formations in Afghanistan,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume 34, No. 3. 
August 1997. 
Hassan, Farooq. The Concept of State and Law in Islam. Washington: University Press of 
America, 1981. 
Johnson, James Turner, and Kelsay, John. eds. Cross, Crescent, and Sword:  The 
Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1988-1989. 
Juergensmeyer, Mark.  Terror in the Mind of God.  Berkeley:  University of California 
Press, 2003.  
Kakar, M. Hassan.  Afghanistan:  The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-
1982.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1995. 
Karabell, Zachary.  “Fundamental Misconceptions:  Islamic Foreign Policy.”  Foreign 
Policy 105.  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Karawan,  Ibrahim A. “Monarchs, Mullas, and Marshals:  Islamic Regimes?”  Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 524, November 1992. 
 72
Kegley, Charles W. Jr., ed.  The New Global Terrorism:  Characteristics, Causes, 
Controls.  Upper Saddle River, NJ:  Prentice Hall, 2003. 
Kepel, Gilles.  Jihad:  The Trail of Political Islam.  Cambridge, MA:  Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Khadduri, Majid.  War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins 
Press. 1955. 
Kinross, Lord.  The Ottoman Centuries.  New York:  William Morrow and Company, Inc, 
1977. 
Lachow, Irving and Courtney Richardson. “Terrorist Use of the Internet, The Real Story.” 
Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 45, 2d quarter 2007.  
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i45/24.pdf, accessed April 20, 
2007. 
Lagon, Mark P.  “The International System and the Reagan Doctrine: Can Realism 
Explain Aid to 'Freedom Fighters'?” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 22, No. 
1. (January 1992). 
Laquer, Walter.  The New Terrorism:  Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction.  
New York:  Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Lawrence, Bruce, ed.  Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden.  
London: Verso, 2005.  
Lewis, Bernard.  The Political Language of Islam.  Chicago:  The University of Chicago 
Press, 1988. 
———. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.”  Policy, volume 17, issue 4, 2001. 
Litvak, Meir.  “A Failed Manipulation:  The British, the Oudh Bequest and the Shi’i 
‘Ulama’ of Najaf and Karbala.”  British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 27, No 1, 
(May 2000). 
Mohammad, Noor.  “The Doctrine of Jihad:  An Introduction.”  Journal of Law and 
Religion 3, No. 2 (1985) 381-397. 
Murphy, John E.  Sword of Islam.  Amherst, Massachusetts:  Prometheus Books, 2002. 
Nafziger, George F. and Mark W. Walton. Islam at War:  A History, Westport, 
Connecticut:  Praeger, 2003 
Payind, Alam.  “Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1. (February 1989) 
 73
Qureshi, Saleem.  “Military in the Polity of Islam: Religion as a Basis for Civil-Military 
Interaction” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science 
Politique, Vol. 2, No. 3, Civil-Military Relations. 1981. 
Riedel, Bruce.  “Al Qaeda Strikes Back.” Foreign Affairs. May/June 2007. 
Roy, Olivier.  Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan.  Second Edition, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Sageman, Marc.  Understanding Terror Networks.  Philadelphia:  University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
Shalinsky, Audrey C. “Women's Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4. (November 1993). 
Sivan, Emmanuel.  “Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution.”  
International Journal of Middle East Studies.  (February 1989).  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stern, Jessica.  Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill.  New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2003. 
Suhrke, Astril.  “Afghanistan: Retribalization of the War,” Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 27, No. 3. (August 1990), 241-246. 
Tarzi, Shah M.  “Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement: Cleavages, Disunity, and 
Fragmentation,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 6. (June 1991), 479-495. 
The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, The University of 
Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group, NETworked Radicalization:  A Counter-
Strategy, Special Report, 
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/reports/NETworked%20Radicalization_A%20Counter%
20Strategy.pdf, accessed May 5, 2007. 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ed.  Islamic Activism:  A Social Movement Theory Approach.  
Bloomington:  Indiana University Press, 2004. 
Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower:  Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.  New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2006. 
Yousaf, Mohammad, and Mark Adkin.  Afghanistan – The Bear Trap:  The Defeat of a 
Superpower.  Havertown, Pennsylvania:  Casemate, 1992. 
Zawati, Hilmi M. Is Jihad a Just War?  War, Peace and Human Rights under Islamic and 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 75
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Abbas Kadhim 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Heather S. Gregg 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Director, Training and Education, MCCDE, Code C46 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
7. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
8. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer) 
Camp Pendleton, California 
 
